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WHAT (AND WHOM) STATE MARIJUANA REFORMERS FORGOT:
CRIMMIGRATION LAW AND NONCITIZENS
CARRIE ROSENBAUM †
INTRODUCTION
Deportation rates of Latino/a noncitizens are higher than
their presence in immigrant communities in the United States.1 The
fact that Latino/a noncitizens experience immigration policing and
deportation at higher rates than other noncitizens is due, at least in
part, to federal immigration enforcement’s use of alleged
criminality to identify deportable (or inadmissible) noncitizens.
The drug war has had a racially disparate impact on noncitizen
Latino/as; however, recent shifts towards softening of drug laws,
including marijuana, are unlikely to reverse the disproportionate
impact of criminal-immigration policing of Latino/as because of
the systemic racial bias in criminal policing.
At least twenty states have eliminated criminal penalties for
simple possession of marijuana. 2 Other states and municipalities
have passed laws allowing the medical use of marijuana. 3 These
changes have primarily resulted from fiscal pressures and represent
an acknowledgment across party lines that the “war” on drugs has

†

Adjunct Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law. I am grateful to
Kevin R. Johnson, Steven W. Bender, Hiroshi Motomura, César Cuauhtémoc
García Hernández, Yolanda Vázquez, and Marisa Cianciarulo, as well as Golden
Gate University School of Law Faculty members for insightful comments, and
those who provided meaningful feedback at the 2015 Immigration Professor and
LatCrit Conferences. Thanks as well to Golden Gate University Law student
Courtney Brown for invaluable assistance, and last but not least, the patient and
thorough De Paul editorial board. Any errors in this article are all my own.
* Search terms: immigration, deportation, critical race, criminal justice system,
profiling. This was Presentation and (tentatively accepted) Paper for Emerging
Narratives: Developments in Global Drug Policing. Carrie L. Rosenbaum, What
(and Whom) State Marijuana Reformers Forgot: Crimmigration Law and
Noncitizens, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
4
GUILLERMO CANTOR, PH.D., MARK NOFERI, ESQ., & DANIEL E. MARTINEZ,
PH.D., Enforcement Overdrive: A Comprehensive Assessment of ICE’s Criminal
Alien Program, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://immigrationpolicy.org/print/special-reports/enforcement-overdrivecomprehensive-assessment-criminal-alien-program.
2
See Drug War Statistics, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-war-statistics (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).
3
Id.
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failed.4 In addition to fiscal considerations, moral and social justice
imperatives, particularly the problem of racial disparities, have led
to questioning of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.5
The “war” on drugs has contributed to mass or “hyper”
incarceration, 6 over criminalization, 7 and the continuing
entrenchment of overlapping racial and economic disparities
throughout the United States. 8 In addition to the financial costs,
the war on drugs has been characterized by and criticized for its
disproportionate impact on communities of color. 9 African
4

After spending approximately fifty-one billion dollars per year enforcing drug
laws, and arresting 693,482 people for marijuana violations, of which eightyeight percent were simple possession charges, at least twenty states have
eliminated criminal penalties for simple possession of marijuana. Id.
5
Ming Hsu Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and
Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI. KENT L. REV. 13 (2015)
(explains in detail the way in which the illegitimacy of law enforcement infected
by racial bias and “unable to stick to its stated enforcement priorities” raises
substantive moral and procedural concerns); Julie Hirschfeld Davis and
Gardiner Harris, Obama Commutes Sentences for 46 Drug Offenders, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/us/obamacommutes-sentences-for-46-drug-offenders.html?_r=0 (in commuting the
sentences of 46 drug offenders President Obama’s decision was viewed as
recognition that the drug was “has been a war on people of color,”); see also
President Barack Obama, NAACP Conference (July 14, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-presidentnaacp-conference (“we’ve locked up more and more nonviolent drug offenders
than ever before, for longer than ever before…in far too many cases, the
punishment simply does not fit the crime,” and “there are costs that can’t be
measured in dollars and cents…[drug law enforcement] disproportionately
impacts communities of color. African Americans and Latinos make up 30
percent of our population; they make up 60 percent of our inmates…”) (last
visited Nov. 20, 2015).
6
See DAVID GARLAND, MASS INCARCERATION: SOCIAL CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES (SAGE Publications 2001) (discussing mass incarceration as a
phenomenon that has become the “systematic imprisonment of whole groups of
the population”).
7
See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. 2008); Erik Luna, The
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2005).
8
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (The New Press 2012) (discussing the criminal
justice system as the new mechanism to subordinate blacks after Jim Crow); See
also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(2011) (discussing the criminal justice system’s disproportionate impact on
Blacks, and to a lesser extent Latinos).
9
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (The New Press, 2012)
(arguing that the criminal justice system has contributing to a new caste system
that has maintained the subordination of African Americans in the United
States); MAY LOUISE FRAMPTON ET AL., AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE,
DEMOCRACY, AND THE NEW RECONSTRUCTION 1 (NYU Press 2008) (stating that
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Americans and Latino/as are more likely to be incarcerated, and in
some jurisdictions, receive longer sentences than Whites.10 Since
1988, the number of Latino/as criminally incarcerated in the
United States has nearly quintupled.11 Minority drivers, including
Latino/as, are more likely to be subject to traffic stops and
searched for contraband even though officers were no more likely
to find contraband on minority motorists. 12 In the context of
marijuana regulation and policing, deeply entrenched anti-Latino/a
bias is reflected in the origins of marijuana prohibitions, and that
bias remains alive and well today.
The last three decades have also seen massive growth in the
criminal-immigration industrial complex. 13 Appropriations to
the War on Crime has “fundamentally changed us.”); see also WILLIAM J.
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (discussing the
“multiple dimensions” in which individuals are impacted by the criminal justice
system, most significantly African Americans); see LÖIC WACQUANT,
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY
(Duke Univ. Press 2009) (finding that the rise in the use of the criminal justice
system to punish millions of individuals over the years was the result of the
political desire to control the marginalized population in the U.S., specifically,
poor blacks in the “ghetto”); see also Reducing Racial Disparity in the Criminal
Justice System: A Manual for Practitioners and Policymakers, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (2008),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracialdisparity.p
df (last visited Nov. 19, 2015); Jamal Hagler, 8 Facts You Should Know About
the Criminal Justice System and People of Color, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS (May 28, 2015),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2015/05/28/113436/8-factsyou-should-know-about-the-criminal-justice-system-and-people-of-color/;
Christopher Ingraham, Charting the Shocking Rise of Racial Disparity in Our
Criminal Justice System, THE WASH. POST (July 15, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/15/charting-theshocking-rise-of-racial-disparity-in-our-criminal-justice-system/.
10
Reducing Disparity in the Criminal Justice System: A Manual for
Practitioners and Policymakers, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 (2008),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracialdisparity.p
df.
11
ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 10 (Picador 2013); see
also JAMES Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U.L. REV. 21, 60 (2012) (“Hispanic prison population
climbed steadily during the 1990s, to the point where one in six Hispanic males
born today can expect to go to prison in their lifetime.”).
12
Reducing Disparity in the Criminal Justice System: A Manual for
Practitioners and Policymakers, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 2 (2013),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracialdisparity.p
df.
13
The term “prison industrial complex” was coined by Angela Davis in a 1997
speech. See Prison-Industrial Complex, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prison%E2%80%93industrial_complex (last
visited March 7, 2016).

Volume 9, Issue 2
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

Spring 2016
3

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

4

immigration law enforcement efforts have skyrocketed, just as they
had with the initiation of the war on drugs. 14 The merging of
criminal and immigration law is “criminalization of immigration
law.” 15 It is in this context that sub-federal criminal law
enforcement has come to play an important role in identifying
noncitizens and sorting “desirable” from “undesirable” persons.16
Some of the flaws and biases of the criminal justice system
concerning identifying and labeling “criminals” have migrated to
the immigration removal process.17
The Department of Homeland Security’s creation and
heightened use of the “Criminal Alien Program” (CAP) to focus
enforcement efforts on the identification, apprehension, detention,
and deportation of noncitizens has contributed to skyrocketing
deportations. 18 The CAP programs, primarily the former Secure
14

Doris Meissner et al., Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise
of a Formidable Machinery, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 20 (Jan. 2013),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-unitedstates-rise-formidable-machinery (noting that in FY 2012 the federal
government spent $18 billion on immigration enforcement which was
approximately 24% higher than collective spending for the FBI, DEA, Secret
Service, U.S. Marshals Service and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives).
15
See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 367 (2006) (citing Teresa Miller,
Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 611, 613 (2003)).
16
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández Hernández, The Perverse Logic of
Immigration Detention – Unraveling the Rationality of Imprisoning Immigrants
Based on Markers of Race and Class Otherness, 1 COLUM. J. OF RACE AND L.
353 (2012).
17
See generally Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the
‘Law of the Land’: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States
and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010); Kevin
R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration
Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 967 (2015); Kevin R. Johnson, Race-Based Law Enforcement: The
Racially Disparate Impacts of Crimmigration Law, CASE W.L. REV.
(forthcoming).
18
Current ICE Removals of Noncitizens Exceed Numbers Under Bush
Administration, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/234/ (“focusing just on aliens who
have committed crimes in this country, the number of criminal aliens removed
by ICE has already broken all previous records, and climbed to an all-time high.
The removal pace of criminal aliens in FY 2010 is fully 60 percent higher than
in the last year of the Bush administration”); Walter Ewing, The Growth of the
U.S. Deportation Machine, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/growth-us-deportation-machine;
Ana Gonzalez-Barrera and Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of
Immigrants Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 2, 2014),
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Communities, and now the Priority Enforcement Program, have
resulted in deportations of largely non-serious and non-violent
offenders, with minor drug offenders comprising a significant
number of deportations.19 These programs incentivize criminal law
enforcement agents’ engagement in de facto immigration law
enforcement and mask subconscious bias and racial profiling. The
“criminal alien” profile has specifically resulted in heavier
immigration regulation of Latino/as.20
President Obama’s recent directive to federal immigration
enforcement agents to focus on “felons not families”21 is a stark
contrast to his more sensitive remarks on criminal justice reform
recognizing the problem of racial bias. The “felons not families”
sound bite oversimplifies, disregards, and even reinforces the racial
biases originating in criminal justice enforcement that migrate into
the immigration system.
Similar to the history of bias in criminal law enforcement,
immigration law
enforcement
has
historically fallen
22
disproportionally on Latino/as.
Modern criminal-immigration
enforcement’s disparate impact is reflected in the numbers Mexican and Central American nationals are significantly
overrepresented in removals when compared to the demographic
profiles of those populations in the United States.23

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-ofimmigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013/.
19
Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (Apr. 8, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/349/
(deportations for drug-related offenses pursuant to Secure Communities,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement actions resulting from initial, subfederal criminal law action were 41,335 out of 368,644 deportations in 2013).
20
See FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 6
(2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-immigrationremovals.pdf; STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE 1 (1996),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf.
21
President Barack Obama, NAACP Conference (July 14, 2015) (transcript
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarkspresident-address-nation-immigration (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
22
FY 2015 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, tbl. 3, https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics (last visited
January 8. 2016) (approximately 94% of deportations under Secure
Communities were Latina/o or to Mexico and Central America).
23
Enforcement Overdrive: A Comprehensive Assessment of ICE’s Criminal
Alien Program, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://immigrationpolicy.org/print/special-reports/enforcement-overdrivecomprehensive-assessment-criminal-alien-program
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Criminal and immigration law have been rife with racial
bias, including marijuana laws, which were first implemented
against a backdrop of anti-Mexican bias and scapegoating.
Marijuana enforcement is one component of the disproportionate
impact of drug law enforcement on Latino/a noncitizens and
provides a framework to consider the more general problem of
heavier crimmigration policing of Latino/a noncitizens. Thus, the
efforts to reform criminal drug law that fail to address racial
profiling or disparate impacts in criminal law will disparately
continue to impact noncitizen Latino/as arrested, and subsequently
deported for non-serious and non-violent offenses, including minor
marijuana crimes.24
While decriminalization of marijuana may decrease the
total number of people incarcerated for possession of small
amounts of marijuana in some states, many noncitizens will not
avoid adverse immigration consequences resulting from these subfederal reforms. Latino/a noncitizens may continue to be
disproportionately arrested and conviction for other conduct that
remains criminalized, because decriminalization will not prevent
racial bias in policing in general. And, the concomitant
immigration consequences of those arrests and convictions will
persist, along with the disproportionate rate of removals for
Latina/os.
In order to understand why marijuana law reforms may not
reverse the disparate impact of the remnants of the drug war on
Latino/a noncitizens, this paper will begin by examining the
disparate impact of the drug war. The first section will
contextualize the war on drugs with respect to its impact on
communities of color including the anti-Mexican and Central
American origins of drug prohibition, as well as the disparate
impact of marijuana law enforcement. Part II will address the
complexity and intersectionality of the problem of the disparate
impact of the criminal-immigration system. Specifically, it will
underscore significance of the historic anti-Latino/a bias in
immigration law to reveal the deeply entrenched nature of this
bias. Part III will demonstrate the merging of criminal drug law
enforcement bias with immigration enforcement from a practical
standpoint by explaining the specific crimmigration mechanisms
that allow institutionalized racial bias of criminal law to be
transferred to immigration enforcement. After setting the stage by
24

For discussion of racial disparities resulting from state marijuana reforms see
Steven Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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examining the dual history of criminal and immigration bias
against Latino/as, part IV will continue to assess the practical
implications of criminal immigration enforcement by briefly
outlining immigration consequences of marijuana-related conduct,
as well as the practical implications of decriminalizing marijuana
for noncitizens. Part IV will also address the shortcomings of
decriminalization, and reference criminal and immigration
proposals to address the disparate impact of criminal-immigration
law enforcement. Finally, it will conclude that the underlying
problem of racially disparate criminal and immigration
enforcement, as described in the prior sections, may not result in
equality in marijuana law reforms, particularly with respect to
Latino/a noncitizens.
I.

IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES
RELATED CONDUCT

OF

MARIJUANA-

The relevance of the intersection of the war on drugs, racial
bias in drug law enforcement, and a history of discrimination in
U.S. immigration laws is acutely apparent when looking at the rate
of Latino/as deported as a result of marijuana-related conduct. In
characterizing “criminal aliens” as particularly undesirable,
President Obama emphasized the moral correctness of pursuing
identification of “felons not families” for removal from the United
States.25 However, not only may “felons” be “families,” but it is
particularly likely that those being removed for minor drug
offenses, including marijuana-related ones, are Latino/a families,
complicating an oversimplified picture.
In 2013, DHS deported over 20,000 people with
convictions of simple possession of drugs or paraphernalia, and
6,600 people were convicted of mere personal marijuana
possession.26 Over the course of the last 6 years, DHS has deported
25

Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks by the
President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, NAACP Conference (July
14, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.
26
Supreme Court Reins in Some Drug Deportations – But Deeper Reforms
Needed, IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT, http://www.immdefense.org/supremecourt-reins-in-some-drug-deportations-but-deeper-reforms-needed-2/ (last
visited January 8, 2016) (“In 2013 alone, the government deported nearly 20,000
people who had convictions for simple possession of a drug or drug
paraphernalia, including over 6,600 people who were convicted of personal
marijuana possession. Over the last six years, the government has deported
nearly a quarter of a million people with a drug conviction.”) (citing Secure
Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
tbl. 6 (April 8, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/349/).
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nearly a quarter of a million people for drug convictions.27 Drug
crimes have well-recognized links to race-based criminal law
enforcement,28 and removal provisions based on drug crimes are
among the most severe in the U.S. immigration laws.29
Immigration consequences of marijuana-related conduct
are complex and are generally either create a ground of removal or
deportation, inadmissibility, or prohibit eligibility for waivers. This
article will not set forth all grounds of removability,
inadmissibility, or all instances where marijuana-related conduct
may prevent eligibility for a waiver. 30 Instead, it will highlight
generally, the ways in which marijuana-related conduct has
adverse immigration consequences sufficient enough to explain the
limitations of some of the decriminalization or legalization
measures specifically with respect to noncitizen Latino/as. A
detailed analysis is particularly irrelevant here because the premise
of this paper is that as long as there are any criminal marijuana
prohibitions or otherwise, law enforcement agents will still be able
to enforce existing laws influenced by implicit or explicit racial
bias. Primarily because the immigration enforcement system relies
heavily on criminal law enforcement, the inherent racial biases in
criminal enforcement will continually filter into immigration and
negatively impact Latino/a noncitizens.
Immigration
Conduct

Consequences

of

Marijuana-Related

Marijuana-related conduct can trigger adverse immigration
consequences for those who are undocumented or lawful
permanent residents. Inadmissibility grounds generally prevent
27

Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, TRAC
IMMIGRATION, tbl. 6 (April 8, 2014),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/349/.
28
See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Race-Based Law Enforcement: The Racially
Disparate Impacts of Crimmigration Law, CASE W. L. REV. 6 (2015).
29
See INA § 237 (a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B) (making virtually any
drug crime a removable offense). See Wilber A. Barrillas, Collateral Damage:
Drug Enforcement and Its Impact on the Deportation of Legal permanent
Residents, 34 B.C. J.L. AND SOC. JUST. 8-19 (2014); Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The
War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 6 J.
GENDER, RACE AND JUST. 253, 261 (2002).
30
See generally Jordan Cunnings, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and
Noncitizens: Uncounseled Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 510, 510 (2015) (clearly articulating some of the main grounds of
removability and inadmissibility in order to highlight adverse immigration
consequences of minor marijuana offenses and disproportionate consequences of
minor marijuana conduct for noncitizens).
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someone from entering the U.S. legally, and deportation grounds
subject a noncitizen to removal. Marijuana-related conduct can
also prevent eligibility for waivers from removability or to avoid
inadmissibility grounds.
The controlled substance deportation grounds render a
noncitizen deportable for a conviction relating to a controlled
substance offense as defined by U.S. code, and marijuana is listed
as a schedule 1 controlled substance offense. 31 The concept of a
conviction is broadly defined, can even include things like a guilty
plea where charges are dismissed later, suspended sentences, and
probation, violations and infractions.
There is a personal use exception to the controlled
substance deportation ground for a first time offense possession for
personal use of 30 grams or less, however many do not qualify. In
some cases, marijuana conduct can be an aggravated felony
resulting in mandatory deportation, where an immigration judge
has no ability to exercise discretion to consider rehabilitation and
to stop deportation; deportation is only avoided if the person would
be subject to torture in their home country. Additionally, the
noncitizen will be mandatorily detained throughout the course of
the proceedings to challenge whether or not the offense is indeed
an aggravated felony.
Marijuana offenses or even just conduct can cause
inadmissibility 32 preventing someone seeking admission to the
U.S. from lawfully entering. Inadmissibility grounds do not require
convictions and waivers are extremely limited. In practice, a
Customs and Border Protection agent at the border can determine
an applicant is a drug abuser or “reason to believe drug trafficker”
based on an applicant for entry’s statements at the border. For
example, because inadmissibility can arise absent a conviction, a
conversation with a Customs and Border Protection agent about
use of a medical marijuana card could trigger this ground of
inadmissibility.

31

21 U.S.C. § 802 (2014).
For those seeking admission to the U.S. to work, study, or immigrate to be
with an immediate relative, a marijuana-related offense can permanently prevent
entry to the U.S. A noncitizen can be found inadmissible to the United States
for: (1) a conviction related to marijuana, (2) for admitting to committing the
essential elements of any marijuana related offense; (3) for “reason to believe”
the person is trafficker of controlled substances; (4) or for being a drug abuser
pursuant to INA section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Immigration and Nationality Act §
212(a)(2)(A).
32
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Sometimes a marijuana offense eliminates the possibility of
a waiver to avoid deportation or overcome a ground of
inadmissibility. Waiver of inadmissibility for marijuana is limited
to simple possession of thirty grams or less for personal use and
requires proof of other factors including extreme hardship to
qualifying U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. There are also
limitations to availability of a waiver, for example, if the offense
arose in the context of a traffic stop, as is so common in
immigration removal cases resulting from the criminal alien
program and PEP. The waiver is also often not available if the
marijuana-related conduct transpired in a vehicle. Additionally,
waivers are rarely granted at consulates – only about 15% of those
found ineligible for immigrant visas on controlled substance
grounds either received waivers or won challenges to the
controlled substance ground of inadmissibility. (Statistics are
unavailable specifically pertaining to marijuana.)
Before unpacking why marijuana law reforms may not be
experienced evenly by all noncitizens, it is necessary to trace the
origins of the disparate impact of the war on drugs, and the
evolution of marijuana prohibition.
II.

THE RACIALLY DISPARATE IMPACT AND ORIGINS
OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

In order to understand why and how marijuana law
enforcement falls disproportionately on communities of color and
Latino/as, and results in disproportionately higher removals of
Latina/os, it is necessary to understand the racialized history of the
drug war and the origins of marijuana prohibitions, before
addressing the role of race and national-origin bias in immigration
law enforcement.
A.

A brief history of racial bias in the “war” on drugs

One of the primary markers of what has been dubbed the
“war” on drugs were the Rockefeller drug laws, presented as a
response to urban poverty affecting inner-city African
Americans. 33 The drug laws were color-blind, 34 but their burden
33

See Edward J. DiMaggio, New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, Then and Now,
78 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 30 (2006). (New York’s drug laws required judges to
sentence anyone selling two ounces or possessing four ounces of narcotics to a
term of 15 years to life which was about the same length as for second-degree
murder); see also Madison Gray, A Brief History of New York’s Rockefeller
Drug Laws, T IME MAG., Apr. 2, 2009,
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fell most heavily on African Americans, and subsequently other
communities of color as well. At the point where immigration law
and the drug war intersect, it has often been Latina/os who have
experienced the cascading consequences of contact with the
criminal justice system.
At the outset, the drug laws served as a means of social
control similar to vagrancy laws of an earlier era, which controlled
the movement of newly freed slaves shortly after the formal end of
slavery. 35 The vagrancy laws were enforced with rigor against
African Americans, serving to manufacture criminals out of
unemployed African Americans. Drug laws replaced vagrancy
laws as a means of social control, in lieu of actual social programs.
This critique of drug laws as a racialized means of social control
persists, in spite of the beginning of a shift towards decarceration
and a questioning of the efficacy of the war on drugs. 36 Similar to
the drug laws, harsh immigration removal measures ensure an
equivalent form of control of Latina/o noncitizens who may
experience disproportionate criminal policing.
Mass incarceration of African Americans and Latino/as
significantly expanded in the 1970s after drug policies shifted from
a focus on treating drug use as a social disease, to increasingly
associating drugs with criminality. 37 The Nixon administration
declared drugs “public enemy number one,” 38 and the infamous
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, serving as the Kennedy Administration’s
Assistant Secretary of Labor, suggested that black culture was
responsible for crime associated with drug use rather than systemic
poverty and institutionalized racism.39
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1888864,00.html. This led to an
increase in drug convictions in the state, with no marked decrease in crime. Id.
34
In some respects, the facially neutral drug laws are not dissimilar from the
facially neutral/colorblind 1965 Immigration Act.
35
Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, THE
ATLANTIC, 28 (October 2015) (Coates describes “postbellum Alabama” which
solved the perceived competition for work from newly freed slaves competing
on an open labor market by “manufacturing criminals” – blacks who couldn’t
find work were labeled vagrants and sent to jail… then leased as labor to the
people who had enslaved them. The laws themselves were nominally colorblind, but applied against Negroes (principally if not exclusively)).
36
Mariela Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection of Profiteering and
Immigration Detention, 95 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
37
The War on Marijuana in Black and White, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 88
(June 2013) https://www.aclu.org/feature/war-marijuana-black-and-white.
38
Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 17, 1971),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048.
39
See ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 41-42.
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President Reagan’s administration significantly ratcheted
up drug law enforcement, largely eliminating harm reduction and
the focus on public health.40 In 1986, Reagan signed the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act allocating an additional $1.7 billion to fund the drug
war and imposing mandatory minimums for drug offenses. 41
Reagan’s official declaration of the “War on Drugs” was marked
by skyrocketing financial investment in enforcement, which would
be mirrored approximately two decades later by similarly drastic
increases in immigration law enforcement. 42 The parallel in
increased funding was not the only similarity to the drug war –
immigration enforcement would also have racially disproportionate
impacts and represented a new form of social control, or more
accurately, social selection.43
In the “war” on drugs, minor marijuana offenses have
constituted a noteworthy share of drug law enforcement. Instead of
targeting drug dealers and dangerous drugs as stated by lawmakers,
marijuana possession accounted for almost 80% of the growth in
the 1990s drug arrests and in 2005 and 42.6% of all drug arrests
were for marijuana offenses.44 Between 2001 and 2010, there were
over eight million arrests in the U.S. for marijuana-related
offenses.45 As of approximately 2009, more than 750,000 people
are arrested annually in the U.S. for marijuana possession. 46 In
40

War on Marijuana, supra note 32.
The discretion taken from judges in connection with mandatory minimums is
akin to the lack of discretion immigration judges have with the elimination of
INA sec. 212(c) allowing judges to consider rehabilitation of non-citizen, lawful
permanent residents convicted of certain crimes, including drug offenses. Id.
42
Throwing Good Money After Bad, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (May
26, 2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/throwing-good-moneyafter-bad-immigration-enforcement (from 2004 to 2008 Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) funding rose from $6.6 million to $180 million,
and then in 2009 ICE began receiving $1 billion annually).
43
Alexander, supra note 33, at 49; see also Coates, supra note 35, at 32 (citing
DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
(1973) (suggesting that contrary to most literature, the first war on drugs
commenced in 1914. The drug war that commenced in the 1970s was actually
our third drug war of the 20th century); see also César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346,
1361 (2014) (on Congress’ laws to “fight drugs” 1986-1994).
44
ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 60 (citing Marc Mauer and Ryan King, A 25Year Quagmire: The ‘War on Drugs’ and Its Impact on American Society,
SENTENCING PROJECT, 2-3 (2007)) (also noting in 2005, four out of five U.S.
drug arrests were for possession rather than selling drugs).
45
War on Marijuana, supra note 32, at 36.
46
Tony Newman, Marijuana in America: More Mainstream Than Ever, More
Arrests Than Ever!, HUFFINGTON POST (November 30, 2009),
41
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2013, 693,482 people were arrested for a marijuana law
violation.47 Today, nearly half of all drug-related arrests in the U.S.
are for marijuana use. 48 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
estimates that police arrest someone for possession of marijuana
every forty-eight seconds. 49 Eighty-eight percent of the 2013
marijuana arrests were for possession only. 50 Additionally, the
racial disparities in marijuana law enforcement follow the overall
drug law enforcement trends and are rooted in particularly
racialized origins.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, lawmakers and others
used race-neutral terminology concerning policies that would have
disparate impacts on the African American community. President
Regan’s “welfare queen” was an encrypted yet racially loaded
connotation, which evaded allegations of racial bias – a style
became increasingly employed over time. 51 Before President
Regan, President Nixon strategically and intentionally shifted
official discourse to camouflage racist policy proposals using
synonyms in place of racially explicit terms.52
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tony-newman/marijuana-in-americamore_b_304499.html, last visited January 8, 2016.
47
Drug War Statistics, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-war-statistics (last visited November 19, 2015).
48
War on Marijuana, supra note 32, at 4.
49
Steven Nelson, Police Made One Marijuana Arrest Every 42 Seconds in 2012,
U.S. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013, 2:42 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/09/16/police-made-onemarijuanaarrest-every-42-seconds-in-2012.
50
Drug War Statistics, supra note 42.
51
See STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND REGRET FROM
U.S. HISTORY, 82 fn. 40 (2015) (discussing criminalization of poverty) (citing a
1994 Heritage Foundation report rationalized criminalization of African
Americans describing so-called “behavioral poverty” and a “social pathology”
which “ eroded work ethic and dependency, the lack of educational aspirations
and achievement, an inability or unwillingness to control one’s children, …
criminal activity, and drug and alcohol use”); see also Miriam Zoila Pérez,
‘Crack Baby’ Hysteria Returns, COLOR LINES (July 18, 2014, 7:00 AM),
http://www.colorlines.com/articles/crack-baby-hysteria-returns (explaining term
“crack babies” became synonymous with the racist characterization of babies of
African American mothers who used allegedly used this less expensive, and
more accessible form of cocaine”).
52
Coates, supra note 30, at 38-39. (Explaining that Nixon’s campaign strategy
and other tactics as revealed by his aide John Ehrlichman Nixon targeted the
“racists’” vote with Erlichman stating “that subliminal appeal to the antiblack
voter was always in Nixon’s statements and speeches,” and Cotes states that
according to another Nixon aide, H. R. Haldeman, Nixon faulted “the blacks”
for “whole problem” of welfare and poverty. The civil-rights movement caused
Nixon to mask his racist tactics thus his aide, Haldeman wrote, “The key is to
devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing to,” and a 1968 tape of
Nixon rehearsing a campaign ad revealed what he probably intended as an off-
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The Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton administrations
criminalized and racialized poverty and created a system of mass
incarceration. Professor Steven Bender explains:
Restrictive welfare reform was inevitable once the
longstanding conception of the undeserving poor
was racialized in the second half of the twentieth
century both by the image of the welfare queen,
which became code for African American unwed
mothers, and by the Mexican face of poverty…53
Stereotyping and demonizing Latina/os paved the way for what
might be characterized as the double penalty of immigration
consequences for noncitizen Latina/os.
Similarly, President Bill Clinton’s welfare reform of 1996
used imagery from slavery to justify demonization of black
mothers. 54 One of the hallmarks of the racial bias in the
enforcement of drug laws was the criminalization of crack cocaine
disproportionate to powder cocaine more frequently used by
whites.55
In the mid-1990s, New York’s police commissioner
instituted a “stop and frisk” policy in the colorblind guise of “order
maintenance.” 56 Data demonstrated that police stopped African
Americans and Hispanics 57 significantly more than Whites. 58 In
2013 the policy was finally ruled unconstitutional, but not before it
helped fuel mass incarceration, and combined with harsh
the-record comment about the unspoken pretext in the script, “Yep, this hits it
right on the nose…it’s all about law and order and the damn Negro–Puerto”).
53
BENDER, supra note 46, at 80 n. 26.
54
STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND REGRET FROM U.S.
HISTORY, 80 fn 28 (2015).(citing Ellen Reese, Backlash against Welfare
Mothers: Past and Present, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) 27
(welfare queen as racially neutral code for young inner-city black mothers).
55
ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 112-14 (in 2010 Congress reduced the
disparity in criminal sentencing between crack and power cocaine possession
from 100:1 to 18:1).
56
Coates, supra note 30, at 34-35; see also Stop-And-Frisk Data, NYCLU,
http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last viewed January 8, 2016)
57
In this particular study, as is common, the data was tracked by the category
described as “Hispanic,” rather than Latino/a.
58
Coates supra note 30, at 34; John Cassidy, The Statistical Debate Behind the
Stop-and-Frisk Verdict, NEW YORKER (August 13, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-statistical-debate-behind-thestop-and-frisk-verdict (describing Jeffery Fagan, Columbia law professor’s
findings).
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immigration measures, contributed to disparate removals of
noncitizen Latina/os. 59 While a decrease overall in stops has
coincided with lower crime rates, there is no indication that
racially disparate outcomes have changed in the criminal, or
immigration context.60 Pretextual policing, usually in traffic stops
and resulting in racial disparities outside of the context “stop and
frisk” practices are characterized by law enforcement as a tool to
investigate drivers.61
In illustrating the Chicano community’s relationship with
the police, scholar Alfredo Mirandé discusses a historic incident
that could have taken place yesterday. Mirandé describes a police
stop where a Denver police officer stopped a car driven by a
blonde Anglo girl, with a Chicano youth passenger. The officer
said to the passenger “Mexican, what are you doing with a white
woman?” and arrested him. He was charged with traffic violations,
dismissed in court because he was not driving the vehicle.62 This
anecdote highlights the historic and entrenched nature of police
bias against Latino/as.
More recently, data indicates that 57% of those in state
prison for a drug-related offense are African American and Latino.
63
Since implementing the drug war, from 1985-1995, Hispanics
59

Coates supra note 30, at 34.
Thomas Macmillan, In New York City, Police Stops and Crime are Both
Down: Studies show less aggressive policing can coexist with continuing drop in
crime levels, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-new-york-city-police-stops-and-crime-are-bothdown-1449875165.
61
David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 311-18 (1999) (discussing
techniques and case law enabling police to use traffic stops to investigate the car
and driver.) (While traffic stops may be used to investigate drivers for more
serious offenses, like drug crimes, the unstated and almost impossible to prove
or contest pretext is the race or ethnicity of the driver).
62
ALFREDO MIRANDÉ, GRINGO JUSTICE, 153 (University of Notre Dame Press
1987).
63
Drug War Statistics, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-war-statistics (last visited November 19, 2015);
The War on Marijuana in Black and White, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(June 2013), https://www.aclu.org/feature/war-marijuana-black-and-white;
United States Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on
Drugs, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 2011),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/Rcedrg00.htm#P54_1086 (Human Rights
Watch indicated that in 2000, African Americans were 80 to 90% of drug
offenders imprisoned in seven states); STEVEN W. BENDER, RUN FOR THE
BORDER: VICE AND VIRTUE IN U.S.-MEXICO BORDER CROSSINGS 164-165
(Ediberto Román, ed., 2012); (Equivalent statistics were not available for
Latino/as, likely because Latino/as are often counted as White making tracking).
60
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are the fastest growing group imprisoned, with a 219% increase.64
Hispanic men are almost four times as likely to go to prison during
their lifetimes than non-Hispanic White males and are twice as
likely as Whites to be incarcerated for a drug offense. 65 The
criminalization of marijuana was similarly infected with antiLatina/o or Mexican and Central American bias, contributing to
both the criminalization of Latina/os and their disproportionate
removal as criminal noncitizens.
B.
Anti-Mexican and
Marijuana Prohibition

Central

American

Origins

of

In early drug prohibition efforts, users of marijuana,
cocaine and opium were characterized by race or ethnicity as
Mexican, African American, or Chinese, respectively.66 Marijuana
prohibition arose in the context of explicit, and sometimes more
implicit anti-Latino bias, which persists today and is borne out in
the incarceration data described above. 67 Evidence of bias is
implicated in part by the implementation of marijuana prohibitions,
which originated in regions of the U.S. most heavily populated by
Mexican and Central American immigrants. 68 Some have
suggested that marijuana prohibition did not arise due to hostility
toward the drug, but to newly arrived Mexicans that were
perceived to use it.69
Racialized and negative views of Mexicans contributed to
the criminalization of marijuana, which was “tied to racist origins
of regulation.”70 Professor Steven Bender explains the context of
criminal classification of marijuana which arose out of
“…longstanding stereotypes of the criminal and treacherous
Mexican” which were “irresistible to law and order politicians and

64

Hispanic Prisoners in the United States, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (August
2003),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_hispanicprisoners.pdf
(citing Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J., Prisoners in 2001 (July 2002); Washington,
DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics).
60
Id., (citing Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J., Prisoners in 2001 (July 2002);
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics).
66
PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 43-45 (The
New Press 2010).
67
See supra. Section II.A.
68
Carl Olsen, The Early State of Marijuana Laws, SCHAFFER LIBRARY OF DRUG
POLICY, http://www.druglibrary.org/olsen/dpf/whitebread05.html (last visited
January 8, 2016).
69
Id.
70
BENDER, supra note 58, at 164.
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voters in scapegoating the Mexican people for the drug trade...”71
Today, the combination of disproportionate numbers of Latina/os
filling prisons and jails for often minor marijuana offenses
combined with harsh immigration consequences is a reflect of this
history.72
The first federal marijuana prohibitions stemmed from the
1937 Marihuana Tax Act, which was facially racially neutral, but
arose in the context of the anti-Mexican immigrant environment.
The first Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Harry
Anslinger, read anti-Mexican statements into the record in a House
Ways and Means Committee hearing on marijuana referring to
marijuana users as “degenerate Spanish-speaking residents.”73
In the time leading up to initial marijuana prohibitions, an
increasing crime-rate and “anti-Mexican bias” fueled marijuana
prohibitions which the Federal Bureau of Narcotics left primarily,
for the states to enact.74 In a 1931 study entitled “Crime and the
Foreign Born” by President Hoover’s Attorney General’s
commission (the “Wickersham Commission”), analysis of arrest
and conviction data demonstrated overrepresentation of Mexicans.
75
Ultimately, the data was used to justify the conclusion that
Mexicans were “criminally inclined” and that they were
responsible for using and selling marijuana and engaging in other
criminal acts, and influencing Whites to do the same. 76 Also
leading up to federal prohibitions, the Christian Science Monitor
published a story entitled “Drug Used by Mexican Aliens Finds
Loophole in U.S. Laws Spread of Growth of Marihuana in Wake
of Immigrants Cause Grave Concern at Washington” citing the
Wickersham studies.77
71

Id. at168 (in critiquing the origins and impact of marijuana law, Bender also
explains that “Accusations of murderous rampages and seductions of white
women by minority users of cocaine and opiates have since been exposed as the
regrettable legacy of racial paranoia in the early twentieth century.”)
72
See supra. Section I.
73
Jordan Cunnings, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens:
Uncounseled Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510,
519 n.42 (2015) (citing DAVID E. NEWTON, MARIJUANA: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 163 (2013)).
74
RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, THE MARIJUANA
CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES
75 (1st ed., 1974).
75
Id. at 76. (citing “A study author, Paul L. Warnshuis, head of the western
branch of the Presbyterian Board of National Missions suggested, “Those who
know the Mexican…would be certain to blame marihuana for a portion of the
Mexican arrests.”)
76
Id.
77
Id. at 76-77.
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Within the states, marijuana prohibitions also reflected antiLatino/a bias, characterizing Mexican immigrants as criminals and
drug abusers. In Colorado, the state’s alleged marijuana problems
were associated with Mexicans who allegedly sold it to mostly
white high school students.”78 In 1932, a member of the Wichita,
Kansas Police Department authored a much-cited article
associating crime and insanity related to drug use attributing “the
introduction and diffusion of the marihuana evil to Mexicans,”
suggesting that marijuana became a “menace” when “native
whites” began using it after they were introduced to it by
individuals of Mexican descent.79
Legislative records are also telling. A Texas state senator
said in the context of considering a law to criminalize marijuana,
“all Mexicans are crazy and marijuana is what makes them
crazy.”80 In advocating for the first federal marijuana prohibitions
in the early 1930s, the first U.S. Treasury Department Federal
Bureau of Narcotics commissioner Harry Anslinger read a
document into the record alleging that marijuana had violent
effects on the state’s, “degenerate Spanish-speaking residents.”81
Mention of the association of marijuana with Mexican
nationals would be incomplete without reference to the filmmakers
Cheech Marin and Tommy Chong, whose films, released during
the drug war, simultaneously both challenged and some suggest, if
viewed over-simplistically, reinforced the stereotype of
mainstream depictions of stereotypical pot-smoking criminal
Mexican immigrants.82
What Ronald Reagan first declared as the “war on drugs,”
has been responsible for the mass incarceration of African
78

Id. at 14.
Id. at 73. (citing Maureen A. Sweeney, Shadow Immigration Enforcement and
its Constitutional Dangers, 104 J. CRIM. L & CRIM. 227, fn. 48 (2014)).
80
BUTLER, supra note 61, at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81
Jordan Cunnings, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens:
Uncounseled Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510,
519 fn. 42 (2015) (citing CHERYL L. CHAMBERS, DRUG LAWS AND
INSTITUTIONAL RACISM: THE STORY TOLD BY THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 97
(2011) (citation omitted) (That’s why our problem [with marijuana] is so great;
the greatest percentage of our population is composed of Spanish-speaking
persons most of who [sic] are low mentally, because of social and racial
conditions”)), see also DAVID E. NEWTON, MARIJUANA: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 163 (2013) (quoting Harry Anslinger’s writings).
82
Jessica Johnston & Cornelia Sears, Wasted Whiteness: The Racial Politics of
the Stoner Film, 13 M/C JOURNAL 4 (2010).
79
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Americans and Latino/as. Instead of focusing on rehabilitation and
investing in communities, the war on drugs, including, but not
limited to marijuana laws, invested heavily into law enforcement
and prison construction, removing federal funds from social
programs and housing development. 83 The result has been the
criminalization of communities of color, primarily African
American and Latino/a.
Professor Michelle Alexander declared the war on drugs
the “new Jim Crow” stating that mass incarceration of African
Americans is the modern day form of pseudo-slavery.84 Drug laws
have been largely responsible for the increase in the U.S. prison
population from three hundred thousand to over two million in less
than thirty years and are a means of racialized social control. 85
Even today, over $51 billion is spent on enforcing drug laws.86
C.

Disparate Impact of Marijuana Law Enforcement

Poor communities of color experience disproportionately
enforced Marijuana laws. Professor Michelle Alexander explains,
“thousands of black men have disappeared into prisons and jails,
locked away for drug crimes that are largely ignored when
committed by whites.” 87 Although White youth use marijuana at

83

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLOR-BLINDNESS, 49 (N.Y.: New Press, ed., 2010) (the Justice
Department’s scaling back of prosecution of white-collar crime in favor of
increasing drug-law enforcement at the street-crime level) (citing KATHERINE
BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS, 47 (Oxford Uni. Press, ed., 1997)); See also STEVEN W.
BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND REGRET FROM U.S. HISTORY
(2015) (similarly describing historic mistreatment of noncitizens and cautioning
repeating or continuing mistakes of the past).
84
STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND REGRET FROM U.S.
HISTORY, 140 fn. 52 (2015) (citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR-BLINDNESS (N. Y.: New Press,
ed., 2010). (“Our War on Drugs is the centerpiece of the third historical phase of
African American oppression, mass incarceration – what one legal scholar
called “the new Jim Crow” facing Black America).
85
Id. at 143 fn. 66 (“The War on Drugs plays a decisive role. Drug convictions
accounted for two-thirds of the increase in federal prisoners and more than half
the state-prison increase between 1985 and 2000.”)(citing Michelle Alexander,
The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color-Blindness 60 (N.
Y.: New Press, ed., 2010)(At the end of 2013, over 2.3 million people were
imprisoned in local jails and state and federal prisons)).
86
Drug War Statistics, supra note 5.
87
ALEXANDER, supra note 11.
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higher rates than African Americans or Latina/os, youth of color
are disproportionately targeted and arrested for drug possession.88
President Obama has acknowledged that middle-class
youth do not get arrested as frequently for smoking pot, but “poor
kids,” specifically “African American and Latinos,” do. 89
Marijuana law enforcement follows the pattern of general drug law
enforcement and disproportionally effects African Americans and
Latino/as.
Racial disparities in marijuana arrests have increased in the
most recent decade with racial disparities in marijuana possession
arrests increasing in thirty-eight of fifty states. 90 Nationwide,
African Americans are 3.73 times more likely than Whites to be
arrested for marijuana-related offenses.91 In major California cities,
Latino/as are arrested and prosecuted for marijuana use at rates
double and triple that of Whites, despite rates indicating that
Latino/as use marijuana at equal or lower rates than Whites.92 In
88

STEVEN W. BENDER, RUN FOR THE BORDER: VICE AND VIRTUE IN U.S.MEXICO BORDER CROSSINGS 165 (Ediberto Román, ed., 2012).
89
David Remnick, Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with Barack
Obama THE NEW YORKER (last visited Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-davidremnick. (“What clearly does trouble him is the radically disproportionate
arrests and incarcerations for marijuana among minorities. “Middle-class kids
don’t get locked up for smoking pot, and poor kids do,” he said. “And AfricanAmerican kids and Latino kids are more likely to be poor and less likely to have
the resources and the support to avoid unduly harsh penalties.” But, he said, “we
should not be locking up kids or individual users for long stretches of jail time
when some of the folks who are writing those laws have probably done the same
thing.” Accordingly, he said of the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and
Washington that “it’s important for it to go forward because it’s important for
society not to have a situation in which a large portion of people have at one
time or another broken the law and only a select few get punished.””)
90
The War on Marijuana in Black and White, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION 20 (June 2013), https://www.aclu.org/feature/war-marijuana-black-andwhite (while the overall number of marijuana arrests has increased over the past
decade, white arrest rate has been constant, around 192 per 100,000 whites, but
the black arrest rate has risen from 537 per 100,000 in 2001 to 716 per 100,000
in 2010).
91
Drug War Statistics, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-war-statistics (last visited Nov. 19, 2015); The
War on Marijuana in Black and White, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June
2013), https://www.aclu.org/feature/war-marijuana-black-and-white
(comparable statistics concerning Latino/as appear unavailable).
92
Arresting Latinos for Marijuana in California, Possession Arrests in 33
Cities, 2006-08, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE (October 2010),
http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/ArrestingLatinos.pdf (Report says
Latinos unfairly targeted for pot use); Josh Richman, Political Blotter: Report
says Latinos Unfairly Targeted for Pot Use, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS
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2008, African Americans and Latino/as were about half of the
urban population in New York but were 87% of the 40,0000 arrests
for marijuana possession.93 In New York City, Latinos reportedly
are arrested at 2.5 times the rate of Whites for marijuana
possession. 94 When Latina/os arrested are also noncitizens, they
similarly experience disproportionate rates of adverse immigration
consequences.95
In the context of addressing drug law reform, President
Obama expressed concern for reversing the racial bias inherent in
drug law enforcement to avoid having a “large portion of people”
who have “broken the law and only a select few [who] get
punished.” 96 He has also noted middle-class youth’s seeming
exemption from prosecution for smoking pot, as opposed to “poor
kids,” particularly “African-American kids and Latino kids” whose
lives are forever impacted by prosecution for marijuana offenses.97
Not only does the racial profiling associated with
enforcement of the drug laws including, but not limited to minor
marijuana offenses result in a disproportionately African-American
and Latino/a prison population, but the disproportionate
enforcement of Latino/as carries over into immigration
enforcement
including
immigration
incarceration
and
98
deportation. Noncitizens imprisoned for drug-related offenses are
more likely to be transferred to Immigration and Customs
(November 1, 2010),
http://www.mercurynews.com/news/ci_16480666?source=rss.
93
Tony Newman, Marijuana in America: More Mainstream Than Ever, More
Arrests Than Ever!, THE HUFFINGTON POST (November 30, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tony-newman/marijuana-in-americamore_b_304499.html.
94
The War on Marijuana in Black and White, supra note 32.
95
See supra. Section I.
96
David Remnick, supra note 81.
97
Id. (“What clearly does trouble him is the radically disproportionate arrests
and incarcerations for marijuana among minorities. “Middle-class kids don’t get
locked up for smoking pot, and poor kids do,” he said. “And African-American
kids and Latino kids are more likely to be poor and less likely to have the
resources and the support to avoid unduly harsh penalties.” But, he said, “we
should not be locking up kids or individual users for long stretches of jail time
when some of the folks who are writing those laws have probably done the same
thing.” Accordingly, he said of the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and
Washington that “it’s important for it to go forward because it’s important for
society not to have a situation in which a large portion of people have at one
time or another broken the law and only a select few get punished.”)
98
BENDER, supra note 46 “By deploying racial profiling and expanded
enforcement budgets in neighborhoods of color and the borderlands, the drug
war results in a staggeringly racialized prison population.”).
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Enforcement custody and subject to immigration removal
proceedings. Professor Mariela Oliveras suggests that the prison
industry, particularly private prisons, has discovered the value of
immigrants and have accordingly commodified them.99
This data underscores the fact that the drug law
enforcement has largely fallen on minor offenders, including minor
marijuana users. Similarly, immigration law enforcement premised
on “criminal” aliens has primarily impacted low-level offenders
rather than individuals that pose a legitimate threat to safety or
security.
It is important to consider the specific way in which
Latino/a noncitizens experience marijuana law enforcement and
reforms because of the interaction of the criminal and immigration
systems, and the anti-Mexican and Central American history
within immigration law. Because marijuana prohibitions arose in
the context of anti-Mexican and anti-Latino/a bias where Latino/as
were portrayed as criminals in part because they used marijuana,
and were allegedly responsible for corrupting Whites by
disseminating it, it is unsurprising that marijuana law enforcement
has disproportionately impacted Latino/a noncitizens and citizens.
U.S. drug law enforcement, including marijuana laws, are still
characterized by disparate impact in spite of an increased
recognition of the harms of systemic and institutional biases. 100
Thus it should be unsurprising that where marijuana law reforms
fail to consider impacts on Latino/as, this historic bias may persist.
When specifically considering the intersection of criminal and
immigration law policing of “criminal aliens,” the history of antiLatino/a bias in immigration law highlights the deeply entrenched
nature of the problem.
II. HISTORIC IMMIGRATION LAW ANTI-LATINO/A BIAS
In examining why noncitizen Latino/as should, but may not
benefit from softening of marijuana laws at the state level, it is
necessary to not only understand the anti-Latino/a origins of
marijuana laws, but the anti-Mexican and Central American biases
throughout the history of U.S. immigration law. The social and
political construction of race has played a role in the alternating
99

Mariela Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection of Profiteering and
Immigration Detention, 95 NEB. L. REV. 19 (forthcoming 2016) (citing douglas
pond cummings [http://law.indianatech.edu/staff/faculty/cummings/] regarding
profitability of mass incarceration of people of color)
100
The law lags behind in providing adequate remedy allowing facially neutral
laws to be enforced subject to racial bias with racially disparate impacts.
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accepting, and discouraging entry and integration of particular
groups, including Latino/as. While criminal law is designed to
distinguish between desirable and undesirable persons based
presumably on behavior and compliance with a social contract,
immigration law has identified acceptable members of the U.S.
polity/society more explicitly relying on national origin, which has
served as a proxy for race. Immigrants from Mexico and Central
America, as well as persons of Mexican and Central American
descent have experienced explicit and implicit forms of oppression
and bias throughout U.S. history.
Beginning with the first immigration laws, a contradiction
in national ethos or identity has existed between the United States
as a “melting pot,” a democracy founded on equality, and
welcoming “huddled masses,” 101 and the nativist, at times
explicitly racist messages warning of “vast hordes” allegedly
“encroaching.” 102 This hypocrisy has persisted, manifesting in
federal and sub-federal law. Exclusion of certain groups is
reinforced by, and simultaneously justifies the implication that
they are inferior. 103 Throughout the ebbs and flows of U.S.
immigration policy, the significance of citizenship, which has
served as a proxy for race, has been consistent in spite, or because
of the fact that race is a social construct.104105
See e.g. KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION
AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004); Jennifer Chacón, Citizenship and Family: Revisiting
Dred Scott, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 45, 64 (2008).
101

102

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (while the opinion
was largely favorable for noncitizens, in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492, (2012), the court cited the Petitioner’s brief referencing Petitioner’s
concerns about an “epidemic of crime, safety risks, serious property damage and
environmental problems’ associated with the influx of illegal migration…near
the Mexican Border, citing Brief for Petitioners 6).
103
Kevin R. Johnson, The End of Civil Rights’ As We Know It?: Immigration
and Civil Rights in the New Millenium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1486 (2002)
(citing Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1753, 1759-64 (2001)); George A. Martínez, The Legal
Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L.
REV. 321, 326-27 (1997).
104
See generally, Kevin R. Johnson, The End of Civil Rights’ As We Know It?:
Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millenium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481
(2002).
105
Devon Carbado and Cheryl Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2011) (citing Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); JUAN F. PEREA, INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRANTS OUT!:
THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES
(Juan F. Perea ed., 1997). (Early rules regarding naturalization—that is, who
could become a citizen—were defined in explicitly racial terms. The
Naturalization Act of 1790 restricted citizenship to white persons, and this
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Critical legal studies and critical race scholar Ian Haney
Lopez has explained that the notion of “Whiteness” was
constructed by and through law by allocating immigration benefits
according to status as “white” in spite of the lack of precision and
contradictions in defining White and non-White. 106 In 1790,
Whiteness was a prerequisite for naturalization. 107 In recent
decades immigration law has formally become “colorblind,”108 as
criminal law proclaims to be, although the excluding aspects of
immigration law impacts certain populations more than others.
Latino/as have been particularly adversely impacted by the
excluding forces of U.S. immigration laws.109
Because immigration law enforcement allows apparent
Latino/a ancestry to serve as an indicator of (il)legal immigration
status110, race and immigration status are conflated. Accordingly,
Professors Carbado and Harris explain, “because Latino identity is
deemed relevant to the question of whether a person is
undocumented, all Latinos live under a condition of presumed
illegality.”111 This inherent presumption has been more apparent at
restriction remained in place until 1952.) See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 1 (2d ed., 2006); Devon W.
Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 633 (2009) (Because of the
similarities between racial profiling of Blacks and Latina/os in the enforcement
of drug laws note that Blacks were also juridically excluded from citizenship, as
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision.) See Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
106
For discussion of race as a social construct see generally Kevin R. Johnson,
The End of Civil Rights’ As We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the
New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481 (2002) (citing generally MICHAEL
OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM
THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed., 1994) (analyzing the construction of “races” in
the modern United States)); Ian F. Haney-López, The Social Construction of
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
107
IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 1
(NYU Press 2006) (citing Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, I Stat. 103).
108
Id. at xiiii (stating of colorblindness – it “wears its antiracist pretensions
boldly but acts overwhelmingly to condemn affirmative action and to condone
structural racial inequality…protects the continued privileged position of
Whites…even as it relegates minorities to …marginalization.”)
109
While I will not address the issue here, other scholars have discussed the
particular problems faced by Latina/os of sometimes being considered “White”
for demographic or data-tracking purposes which erases the reality of racial
profiling and interferes with finding proper remedies.
110
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210 (1984); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
111
Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1546 (2011) (citing KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE
“HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 6 (2004).
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particular points in history, and when combined with anti-Latina/o
bias in criminal-immigration enforcement, has reverberating
effects.
A.

The Foundations of Racial and Ethnic Exclusion and
Mistreatment
Racial bias camouflaged as national origin bias is
evidenced throughout the nation’s immigration jurisprudence.
Negative characterizations of noncitizens have been used to justify
decisions that deprive constitutional protections or circumscribe
immigration rights or justify anti-immigrant outcomes. 112
Immigration exceptionalism, and specifically, the plenary power
doctrine, is one tool courts have relied on to refrain from
recognizing the same constitutional protections for noncitizens as
provided to citizens 113 and has created or further entrenched
otherwise impermissible race or ethnicity-based discrimination.114
The first general federal immigration law, the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, arose in the context of an economic
downturn and domestic labor protectionism. 115 The Chinese
112

BENDER, supra note 46.
There is a well-developed body of scholarship addressing immigration
exceptionalism which, because of recent trends in the Supreme Court and
otherwise, is seeing a resurgence of attention from the scholarly community.
This definition is derived from the work of Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism,
International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism; T. Alex
Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 Const.
Commentary 9, 34 (1990); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration law and
the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Hiroshi
Motomura, Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545 (1990);
discussion of newer trends in immigration exceptionalism and federalism, see
e.g. Stella Burch Elias, New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 5
(2013).
114
Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2011) (citing Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46
UCLA L. REV.1, 5-9 (1998) (explaining that as least as recently as 1996, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act allowed the
State Department to rely on race among other factors in establishing visa
application and procedures and the “purported justification for these racially
discriminatory practices” was that Congress has “plenary, and thus nearly
unfettered, power over immigration.”).
115
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
POLICY 1148-52 (Foundation Press 2015) (explaining that prior to the 1882
“Chinese Exclusion Act” Congress passed a facially neutral law expressly
barring convicted criminals and prostitutes but as noted by Professor Hiroshi
Motomura, legislative history revealed that the true intention of the facially
race/origin-neutral law was to prevent Chinese women from immigrating to the
United States). See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST
STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (Oxford
113
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Exclusion Act is an oft-cited marker of the beginning of
immigration exceptionalism as a justification for disparate
treatment. In approving Congress’ restriction of Chinese nationals,
the Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to deny due process to
noncitizens, including lawful United States residents seeking to
return to the United States, on the basis of the purported
importance of deferring to Congress when a federal immigration
law is in question, even if it potentially abridges otherwise
protected constitutional rights.116
The way in which the Supreme Court upheld the Chinese
exclusion laws, which remained in effect until 1943, 117
demonstrated the Court’s willingness to support Congress’ use of
racial animus in the immigration sphere. Racial and ethnic bias is
demonstrated in Court’s depiction of Chinese immigrants as
representing a so-called “foreign encroachment” of “vast hordes …
crowding in upon us.”118 The Court implied that they chose not to
assimilate, and were accordingly dangerous, justifying
exclusion.119
Similarly, in the context of Mexican immigration, even in
recent years, U.S. courts have employed foreboding, anti-Mexican
language warning of a “silent invasion of illegal aliens from
University Press 2006) (some of the earliest federal immigration laws came
possibly, as a reaction to an economic downturn where the logical scapegoat
was recent Chinese immigrants perceived to be an economic threat and were
portrayed as alien others); see also STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS
ON LAW AND REGRET FROM U.S. HISTORY, 42 (2015) (the Chinese Exclusion
Act came about in the context of anti-Chinese immigrant mob violence
throughout the West).
116
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (Though the tides
may be shifting, this rationale has been employed to justify failure to recognize
full application of constitutional protections for noncitizens.); See e.g. Kevin R.
Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic
Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L. J. 1111, 1113 (1998) (explaining
that the plenary power doctrine has also been described as a means for the Court
to avoid consideration of the constitutionality of Congress’ actions when they
impacted noncitizens).
117
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 25, (Oxford University
Press 2006) (citing Chinese exclusion laws, Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22
Stat. 58, Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1630, section 5, 33 Stat. 392, 428; repealed by
Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600, 600).
118
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
119
Id. (the Court suggested Congress deemed them dangerous and therefore
excludable, based on their mere presence and alleged lack of assimilation,
stating, “If… the government of the United States, through its legislative
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this
country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous…”)
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Mexico”120 and the “northbound tide of illegal entrants.”121 More
recently and more often voiced by those in the media and
politicians than Supreme Court justices, demonizing of immigrants
as dangerous or criminal and tying such criminality or danger to
race persists in justifying exclusion. 122 Such characterizations
mirror anti-Latina/o bias of early marijuana prohibitions.123
B.

Anti-Mexican and Central American Bias

Anti-Mexican and Central American policies have surfaced
throughout U.S. immigration history and enforcement actions have
been carried out by immigration agents, as well as with the lawful
and unlawful collaboration of sub-federal law enforcement agents,
and even vigilantes.
Animosity towards Latino/as instituted through official
immigration policy in some respects commenced with denial of
full citizenship rights after the Mexican-American War where the
United States took possession of over 50% of Mexican land. 124
Policies of the early 1900s were rife with negative and inhuman
depictions of Mexicans used to justify excluding or deporting
Mexicans or those of Mexican descent.125 A critical component of
120

STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND REGRET FROM U.S.
HISTORY, 37 (2015) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 899, 904
(1975) (concurring opinion of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger)).
121
STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND REGRET FROM U.S.
HISTORY, 37 (2015) (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38
(2000) (opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor) (Bender commenting
that “the enforcement focus on the U.S.-Mexico border and northerly ‘flows’
and ‘tides’ ignores the significant number of Canadian entrants who overstay
their visas…).
122
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); see discussion by Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the
Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate Over Immigration Reform by
Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War on Terror,
Narcoterrorists, Ect.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583, 594 (2010); Yolanda Vazquez,
Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the
Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54
HOWARD L. J. 3 (2011) (Discussing portrayal of Latinos as threats to national
security and criminals to justify disproportionate enforcement of criminal and
immigration laws against Latinos); ANNA SAMPAIO, TERRORIZING LATINA/O
IMMIGRANTS: RACE, GENDER AND IMMIGRATION POLITICS IN THE AGE OF
SECURITY (2015).
123
See supra. Section II. B.
124
The law was somewhat inappropriately called the “Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico,” U.S. –Mex.,
art. V, IX, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 930.
125
STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND REGRET FROM U.S.
HISTORY, 39 (NYU Press 2015) (citing JOSE LUIS MORIN, LATINO/A RIGHTS
AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (Carolina Academic Press 2009)).
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excluding or marginalizing Mexicans and Latino/as was the legal
codification of difference. 126 “White” Mexicans could obtain
citizenship, whereas Mexicans of Indian, Black or a “mixed” race
were not white and therefore, ineligible to be citizens.127
Following prior exclusionary immigration policies
targeting Mexicans and Latino/as, after asking for better working
conditions, in 1917 undocumented Mexican mine workers in the
town of Bisbee, Arizona were arrested and deported.128 Local law
enforcement agents worked alongside vigilantes and arrested
Mexicans and Mexican Americans and effectuated the deportation
of approximately 1,300 workers absent any legal process.129
During the 1920s, economic downturn police and local
government officials acted with vigilante mobs to literally run
those of perceived Mexican origin out of town.130 Depression-era
deportation tactics used racial profiling to target undocumented as
well as documented immigrants and many U.S.-citizen
Latino/as. 131 Subsequently, immigration raids around the time of
the Great Depression also targeted those of apparent Mexican
origin for deportation.132
In 1929, restrictionist immigration policy initiatives
targeted Mexican “irregular” immigrants, with laws singling out
126

Supra note 107.
See e.g. Yolanda Vazquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A
Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration Law into the
Criminal Justice System, 54 HOWARD L. J. 3, 639 (2011) (discussing history of
racialization of Mexicans and creation of White race to exclude Mexicans)
(citing Martha Menchaca, Chicano Indianism: A Historical Account of Racial
Repression in the United States, 20 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 583, 584 (1993);
NICHOLAS DE GENOVA & ANA Y. RAMOS-ZAYAS, LATINO CROSSINGS:
MEXICANS, PUERTO RICANS, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 12
(Routledge, 1st ed. 2003).
128
Yolanda Vazquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral
Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice
System, 54 HOWARD L. J. 3, 650 (2011) (discussing Bisbee deportations); see
also KATHERINE BENTON-COHEN, BORDERLINE AMERICANS: RACIAL DIVISION
AND LABOR WAR IN THE ARIZONA BORDERLANDS 198-238 (2009) (Similar
tactics are employed today and reported on extensively by journalist David
Bacon); see e.g. David Bacon, Federal Raids Against Immigrants on the Rise,
17 WEAVING THE THREADS 2 (2010), http://reimaginerpe.org/node/5826; see
also generally DAVID BACON, THE RIGHT TO STAY HOME: HOW US POLICY
DRIVES MEXICAN MIGRATION (Beacon Press 2013).
129
JAMES BYRKIT, THE BISBEE DEPORTATION, IN AMERICAN LABOR IN THE
SOUTHWEST: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 88 (1982).
130
BENDER, supra note 46, at 40.
131
Id.
132
Id.
127
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those lacking language literacy and failure to meet other
requirements. 133 These laws used race-neutral proxies to impose
racial restrictions.
Following the Great Depression, the 1930s MexicanAmerican repatriation resulted in a massive deportation of
approximately one million noncitizens and citizens of the U.S. to
Mexico. 134 Around the same time, Congress held hearings on a
proposed bill to eliminate almost all immigration from Mexico.135
Subsequently, as the pendulum swung in the other
direction, to some extent, the Bracero Program invited Mexican
temporary workers to fill a need in agriculture and resulted in the
admission of about 400,000 Mexican temporary workers, annually
from 1942-1962.136 In spite of poor treatment and no path to legal
status, even after the program ended, Mexican workers continued
to come to the U.S. to fill needs in agriculture.137 Irrespective of
the continuing need for workers, and in spite of having invited
them per the Bracero Programs, in 1954 the federal government
instituted “Operation Wetback” to apprehend and deport
unauthorized farmworkers of Mexican descent. 138 This
contradictory welcoming and excluding is representative of the
historic treatment of Latino/a noncitizens. Though the timing of
when Mexican nationals were no longer needed for the Bracero
133

Mary D. Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV.101, 129
(2013) (describing literacy requirements and tightening of the U.S.-Mexico
border).
134
FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRÍGUEZ, DECADE OF
BETRAYAL: MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S (University of New Mexico
Press 2006).
135
BENDER, supra note 46, at 30.
136
Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of
What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL
FORUM 219 (citing MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND
THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 127–66 (Princeton, ed., 2004) (detailing the
history of the Bracero program of the 1940s, 50s, and 60s).
137
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
2037, 2049–53 (2008).
138
STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND REGRET FROM U.S.
HISTORY, 40 (2015) (describing Operation Wetback wherein during the mid1950s economic downturn the “U.S. deported more than a million Latinos/as,
mostly Mexicans, and even some U.S. citizens because of racial profiling and
targeting of Latinos/as in their communities.”) As was aptly noted over a decade
ago by Professor Kevin R. Johnson, a new temporary worker program, if
implemented with immigration reform, would likely address workers primarily
of color, from developing nations and would have “racial caste qualities” just as
the prior Bracero and work programs did. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of
“Civil Rights” As We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the New
Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1498 (2002)
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program overlapped with the initiation of marijuana law
prohibitions relying on anti-Latina/o stereotypes.139
Reminiscent of the Bisbee workplace raid of 1917, in 2008
federal immigration agents raided a meatpacking plant in Postville,
Iowa arresting 398 suspected undocumented immigrants. 140 In a
new legal strategy also indicative of the merging of immigration
and criminal law, the workers were charged with the crime of
aggravated identity theft, a felony, rather than just an immigration
offense, which may alone have carried slightly less severe
immigration penalties. 141 Deportation procedures were conducted
in makeshift courts, many noncitizens lacked adequate legal
representation, and due process protections were largely absent.142
In cooperation with federal immigration authorities, local
police have enforced immigration law in ways that discriminated
against Latino/as. 143 The city of Chandler, Arizona used traffic
checkpoints to identify suspected noncitizens of Mexican origin for
arrest and deportation, absent probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of any other legal violation. 144 Local police stopped
139

See supra. Section I. B.
Maggie Jones, Postville, Iowa, Is Up for Grabs, NEW YORK TIMES (July 11,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/magazine/postville-iowa-is-up-forgrabs.html?_r=0; Adam Nossiter, Hundreds of Workers Held in Immigration
Raid, N.Y. TIMES (August 25, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/26/us/26raid.html (workplace raids were
proposed as fairer immigration enforcement as compared to home-based raids
and more overt racially-biased tactics brought to light through advocacy
organizations and the media.)
141
Jennifer Chacon, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
135, 143 (2009) (describing aggravated identity theft please in Postville raids).
142
BENDER, supra note 46, at 48.
143
Kevin R. Johnson, The End of ‘Civil Rights’ as We Know it?: Immigration
and Civil Rights in the New Millenium, 49 UCLA L. REV., 1496 (2002) ; see,
e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF ARIZ., RESULTS OF THE CHANDLER
SURVEY 30-32 (1997) (discussing abuses of Latina/o citizens and lawful
immigrants in a local police operations in a suburb of Phoenix, Arizona).
144
Yolanda Vazquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral
Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice
System, at 654 (describing Chandler Roundup) (citing Mary Romero & Marwah
Serag, Violation of Latino Civil Rights Resulting from INS and Local Police’s
Use of Race, Culture and Class Profiling: The Case of the Chandler Roundup in
Arizona, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 75 (2005)); Anna Gorman, Arizona Immigration
Law an Unpleasant Reminder of Chandler’s Past, L.A. Times (June 6, 2010), at
A1, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/06/nation/la-nachandler-20100606; see
also Louis Sahagun, Immigration Sweep Stirs Cloud of Controversy Residents
Sue Arizona Town, Saying Crackdown on Illegal Workers Led to Harassment of
U.S. Citizens, L.A. Times, (Sept. 1, 1997) at A5,
http://articles.latimes.com/1997/sep/01/news/mn-27943.
140
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people in cars or on the street and demanded immediate proof of
lawful status in the U.S.145 Grounds for a stop and interrogation
were speaking Spanish or “Mexican appearance.”146 At least 432
people were arrested and deported.147 Litigation officially revealed
the use of racial profiling.148
In the year 2000 in Kentucky, local police set up
roadblocks on a highway en route to a poultry-processing plant to
verify drivers’ licenses, registrations, and automobile insurance,
and then arrested a group of Latina/o immigrants, and notified the
INS, which took the immigrants into custody when they appeared
in court to pay the traffic fines. 149 Similar tactics have been
reported as recently as the writing of this article, in New Orleans,
Louisiana.150 During the time in which Secure Communities was in
effect, in Maricopa County police officers used traffic stops for
minor violations to justify a stop and request identification, and
take a suspected noncitizen into custody and charged with
document fraud if their identification document “looked
suspicious.” 151 Even if no crime had taken place, this tactic
allowed them to make the arrest, which triggered the ICE contact
and, if applicable, ensuing immigration consequences.
The history of anti-Mexican and Central American bias in
immigration law, and the persistence of legal and sub-legal
145

Id.
Id.
147
Anna Gorman, Arizona Immigration Law an Unpleasant Reminder of
Chandler’s Past, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2010) at A1,
http://http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/06/nation/la-na-chandler-20100606.
148
Corrie Bilke, Divided We Stand, Analysis of Sanctuary Cities’ Role in the
“Illegal Immigration” Debate, 42 IND. L. REV. 165, 185 (2009) (describing
Chandler litigation leading to sanctuary city policy there).
149
Kevin R. Johnson, The End of ‘Civil Rights’ as We Know it?: Immigration
and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. (2002) (citing Ty
Tagami, INS Arrests 14 Hispanics at Courthouse in Monticello, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER (Nov. 21, 2000) at A1 (reporting that local police set up
roadblocks on a highway en route to a poultry-processing plant to verify drivers’
licenses, registrations, and automobile insurance, then arrested a group of
Latina/o immigrants, and notified the INS, which took the immigrants into
custody when they appeared in court to pay the traffic fines)); cf. United States
v. Lin, 143 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (addressing the legal issues raised
by an INS raid on a Chinese restaurant in Lexington, Kentucky). The author
notes that Kevin R. Johnson’s prediction that abuses might increase if “the
federal government affords local police greater authority to enforce immigration
laws” has been proven correct.
150
2015 Annual National Immigration Project Conference (notes on file with
author).
151
Melendres v. Arpaio, No. PHX-CV-07-02513-GMS 10 (D. Ariz. June 14,
2013.)
146
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collaboration between immigration agents and sub-federal law
enforcement agents is one of the reasons Latino/as comprise a
disproportionate number of persons removed from the U.S. as
compared to their share of the U.S. immigrant population. These
systemic immigration law biases combined with the anti-Latino
origins of marijuana prohibitions explain why noncitizen Latino/as
may not benefit from marijuana law reform with respect to adverse
immigration consequences of marijuana-related conduct. In order
to understand why Latino/a noncitizens may not experience the
benefits of state level marijuana-reforms it is first necessary to
briefly describe the immigration consequences of marijuanarelated conduct.
III.

THE MECHANISM(S) THAT CAUSE RACIAL BIAS IN SUBFEDERAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT TO FILTER INTO
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

Within the last two decades, immigration and criminal law
have increasingly merged, and their consequences have been felt
unevenly in immigrant communities. Immigration law has come to
mirror criminal law with respect to the federal government’s
extraordinary monetary investment in enforcement, and the results
of that investment. Federal appropriations for immigration
enforcement efforts have skyrocketed,152 not unlike the increase in
expenditure as the war on drugs commenced. Particularly in recent
years, President Obama and his administration have emphasized
interior immigration enforcement and focus on “criminal”
unauthorized immigrants or noncitizens.153 Immigration law now,

152

American Immigration Council, Throwing Good Money After Bad,
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (May 26, 2010),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/throwing-good-money-after-badimmigration-enforcement (funding for criminal alien programs grew almost
thirty-fold from 2004 to 2008 going from $6.6 million per year to $180 million,
and in 2009 ICE began receiving $1 billion dollars for the criminal alien
program).
153
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation
on Immigration (November 14, 2014), transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-presidentaddress-nation-immigration; see also Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil
Rights: Is the "New" Birmingham the Same as the "Old" Birmingham, 21 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 389 fn 183 (2012) (citing Robert Farley, Obama Says
Deportation of Criminals Up 70 Percent Under His Administration, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (May 11, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter
/statements/2011/may/11/barack-obama/obama-says-deportation-criminals-70percent-under-/); U.S. Department of Homeland Security Memorandum from
Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Nov. 20, 2014)
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more than in the past, relies on criminal records and criminal law
enforcement, conducted often at the sub-federal level to identify
potential noncitizens for apprehension, and increasingly, detention
or incarceration and deportation.
The shift towards interior immigration enforcement, and
the focus on “criminal” noncitizens has led to the participation of
sub-federal law enforcement agents in direct, or indirect,
authorized, and unauthorized immigration enforcement. 154 The
four main programs designed to identify and apprehend “criminal
aliens” within the United States are: the Criminal Alien Program
(CAP), the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP, and previously
Secure Communities), 287(g) agreements, and the National
Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP). 155 These programs
combined have resulted in a massive increase in annual
immigration-related arrests (and incarcerations) – from 11,000 to
289,000.156
President Obama’s 2014 uncontroversial reaffirmation of
the administration’s commitment to deporting “criminal aliens,”157
mirrors prior administrations’ proclamation of a “war” on drugs,
which was met with little mainstream political resistance.158 With
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutori
al_discretion.pdf (outlining enforcement priority categories).
154
Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption
Analysis of Sub-federal Immigration Laws: The California TRUST Act,
18 CHAP. L. REV. 481, 487-88 (2015).
155
Enforcement Overdrive: A Comprehensive Assessment of ICE’s Criminal
Alien Program, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (November 2, 2015),
http://immigrationpolicy.org/print/special-reports/enforcement-overdrivecomprehensive-assessment-criminal-alien-program (some of the conclusions
include: “the program removed mainly people with no criminal convictions, and
people who have not been convicted of violent crimes or crimes the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) classifies as serious. CAP also appears biased
against Mexican and Central American nationals. (Emphasis added.) (“CAP is
not narrowly tailored to focus enforcement efforts on the most serious security
or safety threats—in part because CAP uses criminal arrest as a proxy for
dangerousness and because the agency’s own priorities have been drawn more
broadly than those threats”).
156
MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING
CRIMINAL ALIENS (Oct. 21, 2011).
157
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation
on Immigration (Nov. 14, 2014), transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-presidentaddress-nation-immigration.
158
Kevin R. Johnson, Race-Based Law Enforcement: The Racially Disparate
Impacts of Crimmigration Law, CASE W. L. REV. 6 (2015), (“The simple truth of
the matter is that mass removals of ‘criminal aliens’ are unlikely to generate a
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the drug war, the social problem of drug use was characterized as a
problem of “bad” or undesirable people, branded as criminals. In
the immigration context, undocumented persons have been
characterized as criminals, rather than a part of a larger
international, social problem pertaining to factors driving
migration (wars, climate change, poverty, human rights abuses).
The war on drugs found public support due to these negative
depictions and perception of a social problem as one of criminality.
Similarly, the new focus on “criminal aliens” finds public support
for this immigration enforcement focus by characterizing
undocumented persons and noncitizens with an arrest record,
sometimes even absent a conviction, as criminals. Attitudes may
still likely be an important determinant of perceived mainstream
support for anti-immigration efforts, particularly when immigrants
are characterized as “criminals.” 159 The targets of the drug war
were dehumanized and characterized as criminals instead of as a
part of a public health problem, their criminality in part, defined by
race. “Criminal” immigrants are similarly dehumanized and
implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, defined in racial terms.160
The Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) and previously,
Secure Communities, play a prominent role in criminalimmigration law enforcement. Immigration scholar Yolanda
Vázquez describes the incorporation of immigration law into the
criminal justice system as the primary vehicle for discriminating
against the Latino community. 161 Secure Communities, and now
the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) is the lynchpin of this
system.

meaningful response, much less massive political resistance, and indeed may be
supported by the public at large, especially because the people primarily affected
are a disenfranchised political minority.”)
159
Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs” Meets the
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 4 (2014) (explaining that the general public is largely
unsympathetic to noncitizens with “virtually any brushes with the criminal law”
who have thus “been subject to those aggressive removal efforts.”) (citing Kevin
R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration
Status, Ethnicity, Gender and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1532-34 (1995)).
160
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting
Mexican Immigrants and Crime, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donaldtrumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/; See also
Research Doesn’t Back a Link Between Migrants and Crime in U.S.,
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (January 14, 2016),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2016/01/research-doesnt-back-alink-between-migrants-and-crime-in-us.html.
161
Vazquez, supra note 118.
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As a part of the Secure Communities program and now
PEP, at the same time that local law enforcement agents submit
fingerprint data of arrestees to the FBI, they also submit biometric
data to ICE who is supposed to determine if the arrestee is a
priority for removal. 162 The arrests resulting in immigration
investigation by ICE result largely from traffic stops, or “Terry”163
style investigative stops where an officer need only have a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 164 A police officer’s
actual motivation in making the stop, even if based on
impermissible racial profiling, is difficult if not impossible to
prove and therefore challenge, so long as the officer had the
minimal probable cause needed to make a stop. (And as I will
describe below, in the case of Adrian Moncrieffe, sometimes
criminal and ensuing immigration consequences may result even
absent true probable cause.) In other words, unlawful racial
profiling can be masked by a lawful Terry stop. Thus, police can
use minor offenses, or reasonable suspicion of one, as a pretext to
pursue a suspected noncitizen.165

162

Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, www.ice.gov/pep (last visited March 1, 2016) (“PEP begins at
the state and local level when an individual is arrested and booked by a law
enforcement officer for a criminal violation and his or her fingerprints are
submitted to the FBI for criminal history and warrant checks. This same
biometric data is also sent to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
so that ICE can determine whether the individual is a priority for removal,
consistent with the DHS enforcement priorities described in Secretary Johnson’s
November 20, 2014 Secure Communities memorandum.” Note that some nonserious criminal offenders, as defined by the FBI, are also priorities for
enforcement, including immigration “fugitives” and recent unlawful entrants.
However, where police practices are marred by racial profiling the legitimacy of
the system overall is called into question. Additionally, in his November 2014
remarks regarding PEP’s replacement of Secure Communities, President Obama
emphasized focus on serious criminals. To the extent that the current criminalimmigration practices are both subject to improper biases and fail to identify the
largest possible number of dangerous criminals, President Obama’s goals are not
being met. Some of the same problems in the now defunct “broken windows”
method of policing –targeting low level offenders to prevent more serious
crimes, but being infected by racial profiling, and failing in the overall goals,
seem to be being repeated in criminal-immigration enforcement.)
163
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968).
164
Id.
165
See David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism,
15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 157-223 (2012) (Explaining that another way in
which the lines between criminal and immigration law enforcement have
merged is represented by the suggestion that in practice, federal immigration
enforcement’s merging with sub-federal criminal enforcement induces police to
view the two, criminal and immigration law, as different tools to access in
achieving their ultimate goal and will use which ever best suits the
circumstances.).
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Aware of this possibility of racial profiling, the Department
of Homeland Security created the Office of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties (CRCL), tasked with in part, monitoring the potential for
racial profiling within Secure Communities. 166 While the
monitoring requirements remained the same after rebranding
Secure Communities as the Priority Enforcement Program, DHS
and ICE have refused to release data and documents concerning
racial profiling. ICE and the CRCL had hired a criminologist to
conduct quarterly analyses of racial profiling data, however neither
has been willing to release the reports, nor take measures to
address racial profiling revealed otherwise. 167 At the time of
writing the National Immigrant Justice Center (NIJC), and
immigrant rights organization, had just sued DHS and ICE for
failing to request records pursuant to a March 2014 Freedom of
Information Act Request.168
Once the ICE agent declares the arrestee a priority, they
notify local law enforcement that they wish to seek transfer of a
suspected removable noncitizen. 169 Because criminal arrests can
assist ICE in identifying unauthorized noncitizens, PEP (and its
predecessor, Secure Communities) result in de facto delegation of
some aspects of interior immigration enforcement to sub-federal
law enforcement agents. 170 Sub-federal law enforcement agents
may use traffic offenses or suspected minor criminal violations to
stop suspected noncitizens. 171 Others have described this
166

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties (last visited March 7,
2016).
167
Kevin Johnson, Federal Government Sued to Release Data on Racial
Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (February 9,
2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2016/02/federalgovernment-sued-to-release-data-on-racial-profiling-in-immigrationenforcement.html.
168
Complaint on file with author.
169
Id.; Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, www.ice.gov/pep (last visited March 1, 2016) (ICE is notorious
for failing to exercise discretion at all, let alone consistently with
administratively established priorities.).
170
Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 830 (2015)
(“Arrests provide a way for immigration enforcement officials to delegate
enforcement responsibilities to state and local police, who, in turn, take
responsibility for some of the work of identifying and removing unauthorized
noncitizens from the interior of the United States.”) (citing Adam B. Cox & Eric
A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285, 1330-40
(2012)) (discussing the benefits of delegating enforcement authority).
171
Montana Highway Patrol Settles Traffic Stop Case, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG
(April 3, 2015) (“Montana Highway Patrol and Plaintiffs Settle Litigation Over
Traffic Stops” – challenge to way Montana Highway Patrol were handling
traffic stops – allegations profiling people they thought were in the US without
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phenomenon as police anticipation of back-end enforcement (the
possible immigration outcome), which distorts front-end policing
choices.172 PEP incentivizes state and local police who are more
subject to pressures of local politics and prejudices, to use their
power to identify suspected noncitizens or undocumented
persons.173
Under Secure Communities, unauthorized immigration
enforcement impaired by racial profiling has been confirmed. 174
This practice undermines both criminal and criminal-immigration
enforcement goals of targeting truly serious and dangerous
offenders – noncitizen or otherwise. Use of traffic and Terry stops
are more likely to result in racial profiling of suspected
noncitizens, and as the data has demonstrated, do not target the

authorization. Lawsuit settled April 2015); Some cities, such as San Francisco,
CA, have voted to opt out of PEP as they had previously done with Secure
Communities, and the citizens of CA succeeded in passing the TRUST Act to
minimize this sub-federal collaboration with ICE, although advocates report
widespread TRUST violations Email from August – November 2015 (on file
with author); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015)
(explaining that state and local police enforcement of immigration law
incentivizes responding to local sentiment over federal immigration goals and
creates potential for prioritizing arrest of suspected unauthorized immigrants”).
172
Barbara E. Armacost, Local Resistance to Immigration Federalism, 2015-50
(U. VA. SCH. L., PUB. L. AND LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES, PAPER NO. 50)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2655032, (citing Tan fn. 7).
173
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 115 (1st ed. 2014)
(discussing the higher likelihood of racial and ethnic discrimination by subfederal law enforcement officers.); see also Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to
Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration
Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L.
REV.1109, 1119 (referencing the Lopez-Mendoza decision, where “Chief Justice
Burger believed that INS was ‘better than most police departments’ at
preventing constitutional violations from occurring” suggesting that sub-federal
law enforcement agents are more prone to racial bias and abuse) (quoting Justice
Harry Blackmun, Harry Blackmun’s Conference Notes (Apr. 20, 1984), in
HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, 407/83/491 (Manuscript Division, Library
of Cong., Washington D.C.)).
174
Jain, supra n.119 (2015) (“The potential for abuse has been demonstrated in
several lawsuits alleging racial profiling of immigrants by police”); See, e.g.,
Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 825- 26 (D. Ariz. 2013); Letter from
Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor, Town
of East Haven, 2-4 (Dec. 19, 2011) (noting that shortly after a rapid increase in
the Latino population, police engaged in racial harassment and profiling of
Latinos); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Bill
Montgomery, Cnty. Attorney, Maricopa Cnty., 8 (Dec. 15, 2011) (citing police
testimony that criminal arrests at day laborer hiring sites were conducted in
response to citizen complaints about the presence of “dark-complected people”);
see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal
Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1546-50 (2011).
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more serious criminals stated to be the priority for criminal
immigration enforcement.175
In addition to being meted out contrary to stated policy
goals of targeting violent or dangerous noncitizens similar to the
drug war’s failure to target serious criminals, Secure Communities
also resulted in discriminatory policing. 176 By using criminal
arrests or contact with the criminal justice system to serve as a
gateway to immigration removal proceedings or a subsequent
barrier to admissibility, the same racially disparate impacts that
mar the criminal justice system result in disproportionate removals
and inadmissibility charges against noncitizens of color,
particularly Latino/as.177 Sub-federal law enforcement agents’ vast
discretionary powers to arrest mean that contact with criminal law
enforcement can trigger the cascading effects of immigration
incarceration and enforcement.178 As a part of this process, implicit
or explicit anti-Latino/a immigrant bias can drive sub-federal

175

Barbara E. Armacost, Local Resistance to Immigration Federalism, 2039 (U.
VA. SCH. L., PUB. L. AND LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES, PAPER NO. 50)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2655032, (“If police officers
are permitted (or required) to verify the immigration status of an individual who
is stopped or detained in these kinds of circumstances [Terry and traffic stops
under PEP] it is hard to argue that they are targeting the subset of ‘criminals’
who are the most deserving of immigration investigation or enforcement.”).
176
See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling
in Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, WAKE FOREST J.L.
& POL’Y 367 (2013); Katarina Ramos, Criminalizing Race in the Name of
Secure Communities, 48 CAL. W.L. REV. 317 (2012);
Rachel R. Ray, Insecure Communities: Examining Local Government
Participation in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s “Secure
Communities” Program, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 367, 337-38 (2011); Kevin
R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs” Meets the Immigration
Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
4 (2014); see also Barbara Armacost, Immigration Policing: Federalizing the
Local (VA. PUB. L. AND LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER, PAPER NO. 2014-60),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2504042 (contending that
increased role of state and local law enforcement in immigration enforcement
results in increased racial profiling).
177
Mariela Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection of Profiteering and
Immigration Detention, 95 NEB. L. REV. 19 (forthcoming 2016) (The private
prison industry has seized on the opportunity to grow profits by commodifying
noncitizens and have successfully secured large numbers of noncitizens, many
without any criminal history, and often asylum seekers, and largely from Central
America, to fill their prisons.).
178
Email from August – October 2015 (on file with author) (immigration
attorneys and immigrant rights advocates note that even absent the shield these
programs provide, local police in collaboration with ICE or CBP blatantly and
illegally engage in racial profiling to identify suspected undocumented Mexican
or Central American immigrants and at times flagrantly).
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policing because of PEP helps identify a potential noncitizen who
could be deported because of the sub-federal criminal arrest.
As federal immigration regulations and policies permit a
role for sub-federal law enforcement officers in immigration
policing, it is hard to overstate the importance of the discretion
such law enforcement agents wield regarding whom to stop, and
whom to arrest.179 Scholar Hiroshi Motomura succinctly explains
why criminal law enforcement agents are such a powerful
component of immigration enforcement under PEP and formerly
Secure Communities – it is officers’ discretion to arrest, which is
the “discretion that matters.” 180 Sub-federal law enforcement
officers have significant discretion in deciding whom to stop,
detain and arrest.181
Criminal law enforcement officers can use their discretion
to engage in pretextual criminal or traffic law policing for targeting
those suspected of having unlawful immigration status, based on
observable ethnic or racial characteristics. 182 Some suggest that
Secure Communities had the result of seemingly legalizing racial
profiling in criminal law enforcement. 183 A stop and subsequent
arrest by sub-federal law enforcement officers, even absent a
conviction, can lead to criminal and immigration legal battles,
immigration-related incarceration, 184 and last but not least,
deportation and/or future prevention from obtaining lawful status
in the United States, in spite of family ties or other equities. In one
clearly observable example of racial and ethnic bias in sub-federal
law enforcement cooperation with ICE, a local sheriff seemingly
justified his focus on Mexican-appearing nationals, explaining his
view of persons of Mexican descent: “Their values are a lot
179

HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW,128-31 (1st ed.,
2014)
180
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW,128-31 (1st ed.,
2014)
181
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA
L.REV. 1819, 1842-49 (2011).
182
Maureen A. Sweeney, Shadow Immigration Enforcement and its
Constitutional Dangers, 104 J. CRIM. L & CRIM. 227 (2014).
183
Katarina Ramos, Criminalizing Race in the Name of Secure Communities, 48
CAL. W.L. REV. 317, 338-39 (2012)) (focuses on Illinois mainly a critique of scomm.)
184
The author refers to immigration detention as “incarceration” because even
though it’s technically civil in nature, the experience for the noncitizen,
including the deprivation of freedom, and the place and nature of the
incarceration differ little if at all, from jails or prisons otherwise reserved for
those accused of or punished for crimes.
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different – their morals – than what we have here…”185 This serves
as an example of racially neutral laws enforced by an officer with
express racial bias. Just as insidious is the problem of
subconsciously biased enforcement of racially neutral laws.
Also problematic, or suggestive of a systemic bias against
Latino/as, was the way in which Secure Communities was
implemented. The Department of Homeland Security implemented
the Secure Communities program first in Hispanic or Latino, rather
than high-crime communities. 186 Those arrested through Secure
Communities were primarily minor offenders, and in some cases,
had no criminal history whatsoever. 187 In 2009, thirty-five and a
half percent of criminal deportees were deported for drug offenses
and less than 15% for violent crimes.188 Secure Communities has
also resulted in a disproportionate rate of Latino/a arrests,
detentions and removals as opposed to those of other national
origins.
Not unlike the impact of the war on drugs, Secure
Communities, and now PEP, channels primarily minor offenders
from the criminal justice to the immigration removal system where
more Latino/as are arrested, incarcerated and deported,
185

Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
2037, 2070 fn. 151(2008).
186
See e.g. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, U. CHI. L.
REV. 80, 115 (2013) (Explaining that “the selection of counties appears more
consistent with the desire to target immigration violators generally—rather than
just those engaged in serious criminal activity—because early activations
targeted counties close to the border and counties with a high proportion of
noncitizen and Hispanic persons in the population.”); see also
Thomas J. Miles and Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce
Crime? Evidence From Secure Communities, 57 J. L. AND ECON. 4 937-73
(2014), (discussing empirical data demonstrating that immigrants to do not
commit crimes than native-born people).
187
Tanya Golash-Boza & Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Latino Immigrant Men
and the Deportation Crisis: A Gendered Racial Removal Program, 11 U.C.
MERCED LATINO STUD. 3, 280 (2013) (citing Lacayo, 2010 – (majority of those
detained were apprehended for minor violations, such as driving with a broken
taillight),
https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/902/docs/GolashBoza_2013_Latino.Studies.
Deportation.pdf.
188
Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2009, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS (August 2010),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_2009
.pdf (overall, less than 15 percent were deported for violent crimes – 7.7 per cent
for assault, 3.2 per cent for robbery and 3 per cent for sexual assault); See ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations Report: Fiscal Year 2015, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (December 22, 2015)
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/fy2015removalstats.pdf.
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disproportionate to their population and to rates of admissions.
Mexican and Central American nationals continue to be
overrepresented in removals resulting from the Criminal Alien
Program (CAP), compared to the demographic profiles of those
populations in the United States.189
Specifically, people from Mexico and the Northern
Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) accounted for
92.5% of all CAP removals between 2010 and 2013, even though
collectively, nationals of those countries account for 48% of the
noncitizen population in the United States.190 While they account
for higher rates of arrest, incarceration, and deportation, Mexican
and Northern Triangle nationals are not more likely to be convicted
of violent or serious crimes.191 The interconnectedness of criminal
and immigration law enforcement, and sub-federal law
enforcement officers’ discretionary powers, are largely responsible
for these disparities.
The case of Adrian Moncrieffe epitomizes the problematic
intersection of the war on drugs and the immigration removal
system.
Adrian Moncrieffe: The Intersection of Sub-federal Drug Law
Enforcement and Immigration Law

189

Guillermo Canto, Mark Noferi & Daniel E. Martínez, Enforcement
Overdrive: A Comprehensive Assessment of ICE’s Criminal Alien Program,
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (November 2, 2015),
http://immigrationpolicy.org/print/special-reports/enforcement-overdrivecomprehensive-assessment-criminal-alien-program (The shift towards interior
immigration enforcement, and the focus on “criminal” noncitizens has led to the
participation of sub-federal law enforcement agents in direct, or indirect,
authorized, and unauthorized immigration enforcement).
189
Guillermo Canto, Mark Noferi & Daniel E. Martínez, Enforcement
Overdrive: A Comprehensive Assessment of ICE’s Criminal Alien Program,
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (November 2, 2015),
http://immigrationpolicy.org/print/special-reports/enforcement-overdrivecomprehensive-assessment-criminal-alien-program.
190
Guillermo Canto, Mark Noferi & Daniel E. Martínez, Enforcement
Overdrive: A Comprehensive Assessment of ICE’s Criminal Alien Program,
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (November 2, 2015),
http://immigrationpolicy.org/print/special-reports/enforcement-overdrivecomprehensive-assessment-criminal-alien-program.
191
Guillermo Canto, Mark Noferi & Daniel E. Martínez, Enforcement
Overdrive: A Comprehensive Assessment of ICE’s Criminal Alien Program,
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (November 2, 2015),
http://immigrationpolicy.org/print/special-reports/enforcement-overdrivecomprehensive-assessment-criminal-alien-program
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The case of Adrian Moncrieffe highlights the significance
yet invisibility of race in the criminal-immigration enforcement
system. As has been carefully deconstructed and analyzed by
Professor Kevin Johnson, Adrian Moncrieffe’s criminal arrest,
which nearly led to his deportation and permanent banishment
from the United States, exemplifies the way in which the
“criminal justice system works in combination with the modern
removal machinery to disparately impact communities of color.”192
The facts of Mr. Moncrieffe’s arrest pursuant to a “routine” traffic
stop highlight the ways in which racial profiling in criminal druglaw enforcement infect the immigration removal system.
Adrian Moncrieffe is a Black Jamaican who has been a
lawful permanent resident since the age of three, and is the father
of United States citizen children.193 He was arrested during a local
drug interdiction effort in a small Georgia town resulting in a
conviction under Georgia law for possession of 1.3 grams of
marijuana, enough for about two marijuana cigarettes. 194 The
Georgia statute criminalized possession with intent to distribute; he
received no prison time, just probation, and the offense was later
expunged.195
Seven years after the initial criminal arrest in 2013, the
Supreme Court heard the case of Moncrieffe v. Holder and ruled on
a technical legal issue regarding the definition and analysis of what
constitutes an aggravated felony 196 for immigration purposes. 197
Even though racial bias may have figured heavily in the reason for
the traffic stop, racial profiling was not a factual or legal issue
before the Court.198
Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs” Meets the
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 4 (2014); See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the “War on
Drugs” Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 4, 111-12 (2014).
193
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013); See also Carrie L.
Rosenbaum, Supreme Court Decision in Moncrieffe Signifies a Return to Strict
Application of the Categorical Approach, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (April 30,
2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2013/04/supreme-courtdecision-in-moncrieffe-signifies-a-return-to-strict-application-of-the-categoricalapp.html.
194
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013).
195
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013).
196
See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 101(c)(43); 8 USC
1101(a)(43)…
197
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 1678 (2013).
198
If the crime of possession of a small amount of marijuana no longer existed,
even assuming race was a factor in the initial traffic stop, the adverse
immigration consequences stemming from that stop may not have been avoided.
192
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Professor Kevin Johnson painstakingly analyzed the police
report that is highly suggestive of a pretextual stop; beginning with
the presence of a drug-sniffing dog on the scene, suggesting that
drug interdiction was one of the reasons that officer was
“monitoring” traffic. 199 Among the indicators of racial profiling
was the police report’s author’s note that he particularly liked “the
tint violation as a reason for stopping folks because it negates the
argument that I stopped a particular sex or race…” even though,
as Johnson points out, he would have had a hard time seeing a
potential tint violation because the stop was conducted at night.200
Johnson suggests, “none of the totality of the circumstances
…would seem to provide the probable cause necessary for a
search.”201

See e.g. See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs” Meets
the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 4, 5 (2014). (“One might not even be sure from reading the
Court’s matter-of-fact opinion that Moncrieffe was Black. Rather the Court
treats the matter as routine – and race neutral color blind – immigration removal
matter, little different from the thousands of such removal orders entered each
year.”) Also note that motions to suppress are less available in immigration
court proceedings to challenge alleged racial bias in the underlying criminal
arrest which resulted in the subsequent immigration proceedings – cite case.
And, the equal protection doctrine is rarely raised to challenge alleged racial
bias under these circumstances for the same reason it fails to be particularly
helpful in the criminal proceedings – it is difficult if not impossible, to prove the
racially biased intentions in an officer’s mind at the time of the alleged improper
arrest or police misconduct. Finally, the lack of entitlement of noncitizens to
appointed counsel in removal proceedings makes it a near practical impossibility
to raise such challenges even where the facts suggest they might be viable
claims.
199
See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs” Meets the
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 4, 20 (2014).
200
See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs” Meets the
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 4, fn 71 (2014). (“Brainard later wrote that he looked for “driving
behaviors that people do to avoid . . . law enforcement contact” and “any
violation of law that establishes probably cause to make a traffic stop. . . . [I]n
this case, the vehicle passed me with an obvious tint violation. . . . I particularly
like the tint violation as a reason for stopping folks because it negates the
argument that I stopped a particular sex or race. If you can’t see what’s in the
vehicle, they certainly can’t say you stopped them because they were a
particular sex or race. In today’s world, it seems to be the number one argument
presented as a defense.” Id. (emphasis added)”)
201
See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs” Meets the
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 4, 19 (2014).
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The initial discretionary arrest of Mr. Moncrieffe by subfederal immigration officers, which resulted in conviction of an
offense, considered relatively minor by Georgia criminal law
standards, and was later expunged, triggered potentially severe
immigration consequences. If the case had not involved, the
complicated, categorical approach analysis, it may have been just
another removal case that likely began with a pretextual traffic stop
of a longtime lawful permanent resident, arrested for a minor
marijuana offense.
Mr. Moncrieffe’s case demonstrates how “routine traffic
stops can trigger immigration enforcement actions that contribute
to the racially disparate impacts” 202 in immigration
removals/deportations that impact communities of color. 203 Even
though ostensibly, the criminal and immigration enforcement
systems are racially neutral, one commentator has noted, “because
race is relied on in ordinary criminal law enforcement and
immigration enforcement increasingly relies on criminal
enforcement, removals have fallen primarily on Latino
immigrants.” Thus this case is emblematic of the experience of
potentially thousands of noncitizen Latina/os who are also
disproportionately apprehended and deported as a result of subfederal criminal policing combined with PEP.
IV.
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF MARIJUANA-RELATED
CONDUCT: DECRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA AND NONCITIZENS
Considering this historical context of the war on drugs,
anti-Latino/a bias in immigration law, and the merging of criminal
and immigration law, it should come as no surprise that the
benefits of marijuana law reforms may not be experienced by
Latino/a noncitizens. Before considering new potential adverse
consequences of reforms for Latino/as, and then policy suggestions
to help ensure that the benefits of reforms are equitable, it is
necessary to briefly consider the potential impact of
decriminalization of marijuana for noncitizens.

See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs” Meets the
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 4, 6 (2014).
203
Moncrieffe’s case also demonstrates the way in which the nature of racial
bias in drug law enforcement, and the subsequent penalty of a marijuana offense
for a noncitizen, is disproportionate to that of U.S. citizens. See e.g. Michael
Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRV. L.
REV. 415 (2012).
202
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A. Potential Practical Implications of Decriminalization for
Noncitizens204
Decriminalization
of
marijuana
may
eliminate
inadmissibility, removability or other adverse consequences in
some cases where no criminal charges are brought because the
conduct is no longer prohibited by state law. However,
decriminalization of marijuana will not eliminate all adverse
immigration consequences and may have some unintended, new
adverse consequences for noncitizens.205 Limited decriminalization
still leaves open the possibility of removability and inadmissibility
grounds, and in some ways makes noncitizens more vulnerable to
immigration incarceration and removal.
In many cases, avoidance of a conviction and diversion to
drug court could eliminate adverse immigration consequences. As
an example, decriminalization could eliminate the adverse
immigration consequences of conviction of first-time possession
for a small amount of marijuana, but still over 30 grams. However,
in some cases adverse immigration consequences would still result
because an admission of marijuana-related conduct could still
result in inadmissibility, even absent a criminal conviction. In
cases where there are still criminal charges, or diversion, but no
jail time, such changes to marijuana laws could eliminate access to
criminal defense counsel who could otherwise have potentially
negotiated a more favorable plea for immigration purposes. If
marijuana-related conduct resulted in diversion to drug court
instead of a drug conviction,206 the noncitizen would be in a more
disadvantageous position than if decriminalization had not
occurred and their right to counsel would have been triggered by
the charge. Where competent appointed counsel complies with
Padilla v. Kentucky 207 or otherwise attempts to mitigate adverse
immigration consequences, counsel may be able to negotiate a
better plea avoiding the adverse immigration consequences. 208
204

More complete discussion of the adverse immigration consequences of
decriminalization of marijuana is beyond the scope of this paper, which will
instead focus on the relationship between decriminalization of marijuana and
immigration removals of Latino/as.
205
Extensive discussion of practical and legal consequences of actual or
hypothetical decriminalization of marijuana is beyond the scope of this paper.
206
See Assemb. B 1351, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); Assemb.
B. 1352 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); Prop 47.
207
559 U.S. 356 (2010).
208
Example – possession for personal use of under 30 grams instead of
possession for sale or possession of 31 grams, eliminating the 237(a)(1)(h)
exception to removability for possession for one’s personal use of 30 grams or
less of marijuana.

Volume 9, Issue 2
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

Spring 2016
45

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

46

Absent access to counsel, the noncitizen may suffer less severe
criminal consequences, but more severe immigration ones.
Noncitizen Latino/as experience the adverse consequences
of drug-related conduct more than other noncitizens. The main
reason for this is the disproportionate impact of drug law policing
in the Latina/o community and the way in which federal
immigration law and policy focuses on “criminal aliens,” resulting
in deportation of a disproportionate number of Latina/os.
B. New
adverse
immigration
consequences
shortcomings for the Latino/a noncitizen

and

Even if there are fewer arrests because marijuana-related
conduct that was criminal no longer is, racial disparities will likely
persist in arrest and incarceration, as well as in ensuing
immigration incarceration and deportations. 209 If racial profiling
still occurs in criminal law enforcement, removals will remain
disproportionate because of the expansive and entrenched ties
between criminal and immigration law, and the absence of
effective deterrence to racial profiling in criminal and immigration
law enforcement.
Contrary to the more optimistic expectations of some,
legalization or decriminalization could result in an increase in
209

Steven Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (explaining factors creating disparity in
decriminalization including but not limited to requirement that legal marijuana
retailers have a clean criminal record) (citing Tracy Jarrett, Six Reasons African
Americans Aren’t Breaking Into Cannabis Industry, NBC NEWS (Apr. 19,
2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/6-reasons-african-americans-cantbreak-cannabis-industry-n344486) (noting that recreational use, where legal, is
taxed heavily making it more expensive to buy legal marijuana such that poor
buyers may forgo the legal market for the black/illegal one) (Also
acknowledging the significance of “black” market; citing RICHARD LEDERER,
THE MIRACLE OF LANGUAGE 51-52 (1991)(explaining how more black
expressions have negative connotations than “white” ones.); See also Charing
Ball, Will Black People Miss Out on the Benefits of Marijuana Legalization?,
MADAM NOIRE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://madamenoire.com/337897/will-blackpeople-miss-benefits-marijuana-legalization/; Steven Bender, The Colors of
Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, U.C. DAVIS L. REV., fn. 32 (forthcoming 2016);
see also Carimah Townes, Weed is Now Legal in DC. Here’s Why Drug Dealers
Aren’t Worried, THINK PROGRESS THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 26, 2015).
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/02/26/3626608/pot-comes-to-dc/; Steven
Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 31
(forthcoming 2016); Sarah Aitchison, The Year That Went to Pot, PUGET SOUND
BUS. J. 14 (July 10, 2015) (describing continuation of black market in
Washington even after recreational legalization).
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racial disparity in drug law policing and related adverse
immigration consequences. There is some anecdotal evidence that
police may be enforcing the remaining laws criminalizing
marijuana conduct even more heavily in poorer, more
predominantly Black and Latino communities, because of the way
in which decriminalization has been structured.210 If police use the
same tactics for policing, regardless of whether they are making
arrests for marijuana-related conduct, or other prohibited behavior,
such as public intoxication, or traffic violations, there is no
evidence to suggest that policing will fall less heavily on Latino/a
communities than in the past.211
In
particular,
racial
disparities
reported
after
decriminalization of marijuana in Colorado appear to have
persisted, and possibly even increased, because of the nature of
enforcement practices. 212 Specifically, racial disparities for still-

Example – public use of marijuana may still be illegal while use in a private
home is legal. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. amend. 64; Washington Initiative 502,
No. 63 502. See generally Steven Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and
Marijuana, U.C. DAVIS L. REV.,(forthcoming 2016) (discussing racially bias in
origins of marijuana laws and racially disparate impact for communities of
color).
211
See Steven Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (explaining the continuation of a form of
“broken windows” policing which extends to minor marijuana offenses which
remain criminalized such as driving under the influence of marijuana,
possession by youths, and public consumption) (citing Raven Rakia, When
People are Property: How Strategically Choreographed, Racialized Fear Built
Prisons out of Broken Windows, MEDIUM (July 22, 2014) (history of broken
windows policing and contextualizing marijuana arrests within this particular
enforcement strategy); see also Vince Sliwoski, Oregon’s Hazy Law on Smoking
Marijuana in “Public Places,” CANNA LAW BLOG (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://www.cannalawblog.com/oregons-hazy-law-on-smoking-marijuana-inpublic/ (discussing uncertainties under Oregon law, including whether
consumption in a vehicle is considered a public place and looking to analogous
Oregon authority to conclude affirmatively); David Blakea and Jack Finlawaa,
Marijuana Legalization in Colorado: Learned Lessons, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 359, 374 (2014) (discussing how the Denver City Council narrowly
rejected an ordinance that would have prohibited recreational marijuana
smoking on a front porch). Steven Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and
Marijuana, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (using the above sources to
support the content that decriminalization and legalization that leaves in place
criminalization or regulation of use in public, in particular, will fall
disproportionately on poor people, who are more likely to be persons of color,
largely because their marijuana use is forced into public spaces due to
overcrowding in homes and other reasons).
212
New Report Provides Comprehensive Data on Marijuana Arrests and
Charges in Colorado After Legal Regulation for Adult Use, DRUG POLICY
ALLIANCE (April 24, 2015), http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2015/03/new210
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illegal and petty charges persist for African Americans compared
to Whites. African Americans in Colorado are 2.4 times more
likely than Whites to be arrested for remaining marijuana
violations.213 While Latino/a-related data is not available as of the
time of writing, there is no reason to assume the historic disparate
impact on Latino/as has changed.
Absent more comprehensive decriminalization or
legalization measures, Adrian Moncrieffe and similarly situated
noncitizens may similarly not have escaped the initial traffic stop
even if Georgia had decriminalized possession of marijuana. If
only possession of a small amount of marijuana were
decriminalized, Mr. Moncrieffe could still even have faced the
same underlying criminal charges. As Professor Victor Romero
explains, the Moncrieffe decision still allows for deportation for
minor drug offenders. 214 If marijuana offenses are still
criminalized, or in some cases, even where they are not
criminalized, individuals like Mr. Moncrieffe may still suffer
adverse immigration consequences stemming from potentially
discriminatory policing.215
C. Proposals to Ensure Criminal Law Reforms are
Inclusive and Equitable
There are proposals to decrease racial profiling in the
criminal-immigration sphere and ensure that the benefits of
marijuana decriminalization are experienced by all equally, though
any solution that does not address the intersection of criminal and
immigration law will be incomplete. In the context of drug law
reform where racial bias is acknowledged as a problem, proposed
solutions include: training of officers to avoid racial profiling,
restricting discretion in traffic stops, providing meaningful
remedies for impermissible stops, and eliminating policies that
incentivize arrests for minor offenses that have historically been
used as a part of pretextual policing. However, these changes may
still fall short if police still believe they can identify a potential
noncitizen who could end up in removal proceedings because of an
arrest they make as a result of the relationship between the
criminal and immigration law enforcement systems. The same is
true even where such bias is subconscious. Even if the Priority
report-provides-comprehensive-data-marijuana-arrests-and-charges-coloradoafter-leg.
213
Id.
214
See Victor C. Romero, A Meditation on Moncrieffe: On Marijuana,
Misdemeanants, and Migrants, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 23, 32-33 (2013-14).
215
Id.
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Enforcement Program replacing Secure Communities shifts
discretion away from sub-federal policing by minimizing the
incentive for sub-federal police to engage in de facto immigration
enforcement, 216 the continued use of the “criminal alien” profile
will ensure the persistence of bias in policing and it’s transmission
to immigration enforcement.217
Criminal law enforcement changes in isolation of the
criminal-immigration paradigm may be incomplete, particularly
where racial bias in policing has been a deeply entrenched,
systemic problem for decades. Some of the suggestions to
minimize adverse consequences of marijuana conduct for
noncitizens to better correspond with state measures and address
profiling include: legalizing marijuana at the federal level and
amending the INA to eliminate controlled substance
inadmissibility and deportation grounds for minor marijuana
offenses. While these measures might eliminate law enforcement
agents’ use of marijuana-related conducted to identify potential
noncitizens for removal, such changes may do little to impact the
systemic bias that characterizes the immigration removal system,
particularly when it relies on a conception of criminality to identify
less desirable persons for full participation and residence in the
United States polity.
Additionally, provision of appointed counsel for
noncitizens with marijuana charges would help ensure remedies
available are pursued, including motions to suppress where
possible. Immigration trial attorneys could exercise prosecutorial
discretion to refrain from bringing removal proceedings against a
noncitizen with minor marijuana charges to better reflect the trend
in minimizing the adverse criminal consequences of marijuanarelated conduct. At least one scholar has suggested that the
significant number of removals based on minor criminal offenses
is both a failing of the criminal-immigration enforcement model
and an indication of ICE’s failure to monitor its agents and ensure
agents consistently exercise policy directives on discretion. 218
See Juliet Stumpf, D(e)Volving Discretion – Lessons from the Life and Times
of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1267 (2015), (discussing the
possibility of PEP shifting the de facto “devolution of enforcement discretion
into a de jury policy” such that macro-level, federal immigration enforcement
policies are reflected in reality)
217
Angelica Charazo, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
218
Barbara E. Armacost, Local Resistance to Immigration Federalism, 2015-50
U. VA. SCH. L., PUB. L. AND LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES, PAPER NO. 50
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2655032.
216
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Terminating, rather than modifying what was renamed the Priority
Enforcement Program could significantly disrupt the criminalimmigration pipeline. Congress could bring back discretionary
immigration relief ended by Congress in 1996 by eliminating INA
section 212(c).
The complete application of the Sixth Amendment in
immigration court would make motions to suppress more helpful.
However, motions to suppress do not entirely prevent critical
evidence of national origin, necessary for proving the charges in a
Notice to Appear from entering the record and are, therefore,
limited in their ability to deter or challenge sub-federal criminal
law enforcement racial profiling that results in immigration
removal proceedings. One scholar has suggested the trigger for
removal proceedings be triggered by more substantial indicia of
criminality – presumably a more substantial criminal history. 219
However, if the significance of the pervasiveness of racial bias in
criminal policing and prosecutions are not remedied this may only
serve to entrench further and validate the criminal paradigm.
One scholar suggests courts be permitted to inquire into the
subjective motivation of sub-federal law enforcement agents’
motivation for a stop.220 However, given the difficulty of proving
intent of an officer, without a right to appointed counsel the ability
to inquire into the subjective motivation for a stop, and then taking
appropriate remedial action may prove challenging.
The ICE Task Force on Secure Communities suggested
withholding immigration enforcement action and refraining from
issuing a Notice to Appear where the only offense is a minor traffic
violation. 221 However, implementing consistent immigrantfavorable discretionary practices has proven to be an intractable
challenge for ICE. ICE has also directed officers, under PEP, to
pursue removal where an individual was convicted, not just
arrested. However, there is no indication yet, that officers honor
these instructions in practice.
219

HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW,128-31 (1st ed.,
2014); Mary D. Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 101,
129, Mary D. Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 101,
156 (describing requiring “an indicia of risk beyond criminal status, such as
significant prior criminal history”).
220
Armacost, supra note 215.
221
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, TASK FORCE ON SECURE
COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2011),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities.pdf
(ICE is responding to criticisms).
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If marijuana law follows the path of lesbian and gay
marriage laws, state level changes could lead to change at the
federal level that could have a positive collateral immigration
impact. This may already be occurring as Congress may have
recently ended the government’s ban on medical marijuana.222 In
the immigration law context, when the Supreme Court issued a
ruling recognizing gay marriages entered into at the state level,
lesbian and gay married couples no longer faced a discrepancy at
the federal level when seeking immigration benefits based on their
marriages. In the marijuana law context, the adverse immigration
implications of marijuana-related conduct would be eliminated if
the federal government eventually decriminalizes or legalizes
marijuana.223
However, there is a drastic difference between the struggle
for marriage equality, and the landscape surrounding challenging
crimmigration enforcement. The problem of racial bias in the
criminal system and its transmission into immigration enforcement
suggest a more intractable problem that may not be entirely solved,
even by the federal-level legalization of marijuana, as long as
immigration enforcement relies on the “criminal alien” profile.
Immigration Federalism may provide yet another avenue of
addressing the disparities resulting from criminal-immigration
enforcement. The increasing role of states in immigration
enforcement suggests that where states are changing marijuana
laws and the federal government policies have not caught up; states
could use this as yet another way to enter the business of declining
federal criminal-immigration enforcement invitations. In line with
TRUST Acts in California and Connecticut and the many localities
that have opted out of cooperation with PEP and detainer policies,
sub-federal entities could help ensure that noncitizens do not get
identified for removal as a result of minor marijuana offenses
where sub-federal agents make the initial arrest. The same policy
incentives motivating sub-federal entities to engage in sanctuary
policies would justify their taking a position on refraining from
cooperating with federal immigration enforcement efforts where
minor marijuana offenses were at issue. This would send a
message to the Federal government, specifically Congress,
regarding the need for the federal government and sub-federal
222

Evan Halper, Congress quietly ends federal government ban on medical
marijuana, LA TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-namedical-pot-20141216-story.html
223
Id.
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entities to have a more collaborative relationship where criminalimmigration enforcement is concerned, especially with equality
principles.
CONCLUSION
State-level marijuana reform and criminal justice reform
more broadly, put a spotlight on the ways in which the inequities
of criminal enforcement transmit into the immigration removal
system. Marijuana law and criminal justice reform, however,
provide the opportunity to deeply scrutinize these inequities
through consideration of systemic changes to both the immigration
and criminal justice systems, as well as the place where the two
meet – crimmigration or the criminal-immigration removal system.
Rather than take to task criminal justice reformers for not ensuring
that noncitizens also benefit from state-level marijuana reforms,
this article has intended to highlight the deeper, more systemic
problems at the intersection of criminal-immigration law
enforcement, through the lens of marijuana reform.
The issue of state-level marijuana reforms also raises issues
of federalism and the relationship between the states and federal
immigration law. Perhaps states that have taken steps to
decriminalize or legalize marijuana who currently cooperate with
federal immigration enforcement efforts, such as the Priority
Enforcement Program, will opt out of such collaborations as a way
of conveying to the federal government that federal immigration
law should respect state-level criminal justice reforms. If states
have decided to treat marijuana offenses more favorably than in the
past, but noncitizens, particularly Latino/as, suffer continued
adverse immigration consequences, states could choose this route
as a means of noncooperation to encourage federal policy change
in keeping with sub-federal political and social policy changes.
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